IMT Nuremberg Archives

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International Court of Justice

H1165 – 0001

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ERICH RAEDER

Document No.	Court No.	Document Book.	Trans-cription Pages.	Description	Date
C 12	GB 226			OKW Directive to sink neutral shipping near England.	30 Dec. 1939
C 23	US 49	M	447.	Displacement Tonnages - actual & published.	18 Feb. 1938
C 27	GB 225			Minutes of Meeting Hitler - Raeder	30 Dec. 1939
C 29	US 46	M	443.	Raeder memo re support by German Navy to German Arms Industry.	31 Jan. 1933
C 38 (p.2)	GB 223			Order to attack Soviet submarines.	13 June 1941
C 66a	GB 81	3	1065, 1073 1076.	Raeder memo to Admiral Assman	10 Jan. 1944
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C 124				Secret letter ordering extinction of Leningrad	29 Sep. 1941
C 135				Extract from history of war organization.	Undated.
C 141	US 47	M	445	Order of Raeder re secret torpedo-carrying E-boats	10 Feb. 1932
C 152	GB 122	Q	1230, 1249	War Staff File. Raeder urges Hitler to induce Japan to attack Singapore.	18 Mar. 1941
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C 166	US 48	M	447	Plan for secret construction of auxiliary cruisers.	12 Mar. 1934

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C 176	GB 228			Admiral Backmann Diary. Shooting of Commandos. Entries 10 & 11 Dec. and 2 Signals.	
C 179				Hitler Decree to shoot Commandos.	28 Oct. 1942
C 189	US 44	M	441	Note on Hitler-Raeder Conference on Rearmament	1934
C 190	US 45	M	442	Hitler-Raeder Conference on Rearmament	2 Nov. 1934
EC 177		K		Minutes of Secret Meeting re Reich Defence Council	26 Apr. 1933
L 79	US 27	L	359,408, 930.	Hitler Conference on Poland P.1 only.	23 May 1939
386-PS	US 25	L	336,735.	Hitler Conference P.1 only.	5 Nov. 1937
2031-PS				1938 RGB establishing Secret Cabinet Council	4 Feb. 1938
2098-PS				1938 RGB Durer re Reich Cabinet	25 Feb. 1938
2194-PS	US 36	Q	410	Reich Defence Law (para 10, pp 5-6 of translation)	4 Sep. 1938
2879-PS				Das Archiv. Hitler awards Cabinet members NSDAP Golden Badge of Honour	30 Jan. 1937
2879-PS				Raeder speech on Heroes Day	12 Mar. 1939
2888-PS	US 13		254	Certificate of Positions held by Raeder	
3260-PS				Voelkischer Beobachter re sinking of Athenia.	23 Oct. 1939
UK 65 C 157	GB 224			Navy memo to Hitler on intensification of war against England (Also indexed as L 184 and C157)	

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Document No.	Court No.	Document Book.	Trans-cript Pages	Description	Date
D 448				Voelkischer Beobachter 25 Apr. 1942 on Raeder.	
D 481				1934 RGB p.785 (20 Aug. 1934) - new oath for Navy	20 Aug.34
D 638				Doenitz affidavit No. 10 re Athenia dated 17 November 1945	17 Nov.45
D 653	GB 232			Raeder Speech	12 Mar.39
D 654				Affidavit of Schmidt	
D 655	GB 231			Raeder interview with Hitler on 6 Jan. 1943	
D 658	GB 229			Extract from SKL War Diary on shooting of Marines	9 Dec.1942
D 659				Extract from War Diary of Chief of U-Boats.	27 Sep.39
D 662	GB 222			Logbook of U 30	22 Aug.
1807 PS	GB 227			Extract from Jodl Diary	16 Jun.4?

4149)

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Document No.	Court No.	Document Book.	Trans-cription Pages.	Description.	Date.
D 448				Voelkischer Beobachter 25 Apr.42 on Raeder.	
D 481				1934 RGB p.785 (20 Aug 1934)--new oath for Navy.	20 Aug. 1934
D 638				Doenitz affidavit No. 10 re Athenia dated 17 November 1945	
D 653				EXTRACTS FROM RAEDER'S SPEECH	
D 654				ADOLF SCHMIDT AFFIDAVIT	
D 655				RAEDER SPEECH ON HEROES DAY	12 MARCH 1939
D 658				EXTRACT FROM SKL WAR DIARY	9 DEC., 1942

Filed
Read 15.1.46
GB 226

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-12
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Supreme Command of Armed Forces.
WFA No. 22249/39 d.K. Chefs.Abt.L.I.

Berlin. 30/20.12.39.

Re: Conduct of U-boat warfare on Merchant shipping against England.

Ob.d.M.,C/Skl. and 1/Skl.

11 Copies
1st. Copy.

Ob.d.M.
I. op.i/40.

S.O. Only.
Access only through an officer

Completed 1.1.40.
Enclosures Nil.

On 30.12.39 according to a report of Ob.d.M., the Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces decided that:-

(1) Greek merchant ships in the area around England declared by U.S.A. to be a barred zone are to be treated as enemy vessels.

(Pencil note) - Too narrowly defined.

(2) In the Bristol Channel, all shipping may be attacked without warning - where the impression of a mining incident can be created.

Both measures are authorised to come into effect immediately.

(Pencil Note) - Add to (1) Attack must be carried out without being seen, the denial of the sinking of these steam-ships in case the expected protests are made must be possible.
(OKW 2201/40 G
Vol. of 7(?) I, 40).
Para. 10(?), Skl I.
Op 64/40.

C.-in-C. High Command.

By Order.

(signature JODL.

Distribution:
OKM - 1A

OKW -
WFA - 2A
H/K - 3A
Abroad - 4A
L - 5 - 9A

Inform OKH - 10A.
Rdl and Ob.d.L. - 11A

- - - - - -

H1165-0006

H1165 - 0007

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-12

28 November 1945.

I, D. E. SHERRIFF, Second Officer, WRNS, 36482, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. C-12.

D. E. SHERRIFF,
2/O, WRNS,
36482.

H1165 - 0008

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-23
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

(SFC 24-3/C.23)

(Translation of an extract from an unnamed, unnumbered file containing notes year by year from 1927 - 1940 on the reconstruction of the German Navy).

O.K.M.

/ - 21 - 1 Questions of Type, Shipbuilding Plan.

C O P Y

Copy No. 2.

Berlin, 18. 2. 1938

M

to

Head of Office /

. . . . . .

The true displacement of the battleship »Scharnhorst - Gneisenau« and »F/G« exceeds by 20 % in both cases the displacement reported to the British.

. . . . . .

	Length	Beam	Displacement by Type actual	notified	Draught actual/notified	
Scharnhorst	226.0	30.0	-31.300 ts	26.000 ts	8.55	7.50
»F«	241.0	36.0	-41.700 ts	35.000 ts	8.60	7.90
»HI«	254.0	41.0	-56.200 ts	46.850 ts	9.60	8.40
or »H II«	254.0	41.0	-56.200 ts	45.000 ts	9.60	8.15
or »HIII«	254.0	41.0	-56.200 ts	43.000 ts	9.60	7.85

. . . . . .

In the opinion of A IV it would under no circumstances be right to report a larger tonnage than that which for instance England, Russia or Japan will probably publish shortly, in order that we may not put upon ourselves the blame for a race in armaments.

H1165 - 0009

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-23
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(Cont.)

(Translation of an extract from an unnamed, unnumbered file containing notes year by year from 1927 - 1940 on the reconstruction of the German Navy).

SEC 24 - 3/C.23

O.K.M.

Shipbuilding Plans. BZ 221 Vol. 5 S. 5

C O P Y

Copy No. 2.

Berlin, 8. 3. 1938

General Navy Office BB 6207/38

to M (Chief of Staff

with request to bring to the attention of the C - in - C Navy).

Subject: Address by C in C Navy to Directors of Shipbuilding Yards.

. . . . . It is proposed to make a statement/ some what along the following lines:

"In a clear cut programme for the construction of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor has set the Navy the task the carrying out of the aims of his foreign policy . . . . "

H1165-0010

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-23
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(Cont.)

(Translation of an extract from an unnamed, unnumbered file containing notes year by year from 1927 - 1940 on the reconstruction of the German Navy.)

(SEC 24 - 3/C. 23)

R.W.M.

A 24 - 2 Planning Committee.

C O P Y

Copy No. 2

Carls
Admiral and C - in C Fleet

Tender »Hela« September 1938

Top Secret

Opinion on the »Draft Study of Naval Warfare against England«.

A. There is full agreement with the main theme of the study.

1. If according to the Fuehrer's decision Germany is to acquire a position as a world power she needs not only sufficient colonial possessions but also secure naval communications and secure access to the ocean.

2. Both requirements can only be fulfilled in opposition to anglo - french interests and would limit their position as world powers. It is unlikely that they can be achieved by peaceful means. The decision to make Germany a world power therefore forces upon us the necessity of making the corresponding preparations for war.

3. War against England means at the same time war against the Empire, against France, probably against Russia as well and a large number of countries overseas, in fact against ½ to 2/3 of the whole world.

It can only be justified and have a chance of success if it is prepared economically as well as politically and militarily and waged with the aim of conquering for Germany an outlet to the ocean.

. . . . . .

H1165 - 0011

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-23

12. November 1945

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, 2nd Lt., 01332102, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document C-23.

GERARD SCHAEFER
2nd Lt.
01332102

H1165 – 0012

Filed
Read 15.1.46

C.27 GB 225

(SEC-24-3/C-27)

30.XII.39 MEETING BETWEEN C-in-C NAVY AND THE FÜHRER.

(See the report of the meeting in War diary, Part C, Vol. 7
KTB Teil C. Heft 7 - for separate items of the meeting)

Special points:

1) Reference to the necessity of attacks by the G.A.F. on trade traffic in the Downs (as it is under the Command and protection of the British Navy) C-in-C, G.A.F. will obtain the Führer's decision in his own time. The Führer, in agreement with Chief of the Naval War Staff, considers it necessary to give previous warning to the neutrals.

2) The Führer confirms the intention of making a proclamation at the time of a general intensification of the War. The Chief of the Naval War Staff requests that full power be given to the Naval War Staff in making any intensification suited to the situation and to means of war. The Führer fundamentally agrees to the sinking without warning of Greek ships in the American prohibited area and of neutral ships in those sections of the American prohibited area in which the fiction of mine - danger can be upheld, e.g. the Bristol Channel.

The Führer is reserving the publication of the law in reply to the order in council until the moment of the intensification of the war.

3) The considerate treatment of friendly neutrals is to be continued.

4) The Führer agrees that no guarantee can be given to the Italians, that their trade traffic with Britain may be carried on with safety, owing to mining.

5)
6) Not relevant.

(3541)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-99
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

B.Nr. MI 376/33 Top secret. Berlin W, 31 January 1933

TOP SECRET

General directions for support given by the German Navy to the German Armament Industry.

The effects of the present economic depression have led here and there to the conclusion that there are no prospects of an active participation of the German Armament Industry abroad, even if the Versailles terms are no longer kept. There is no profit in it a nd it is therefore not worth promoting. Furthermore, the view has been taken that the increasing "self-sufficiency" would in any case make such participation superfluous.

However obvious these opinions may seem, formed because of the situation as it is today, I am nevertheless forced to make the following contradictory corrective points:

a) The economic crisis and its present effects must perforce be overcome sooner or later.

Though equality of rights in war politics is not fully recognized today, it will, by the assimilation of weapons, be achieved at some period, at least to a certain extent,

b) The consequent estimation of the duties of the German Armament Industry lies mainly in the Military-political sphere.

It is impossible for this industry to satisfy, militarily and economically, the growing demands made of it by limiting the deliveries to our own armed forces. Its capacity must therefore be increased by the delivery of supplies to foreign countries over and above our own requirements.

c) Almost every country is working to the same end today, even those which, unlike Germany, are not tied down by restrictions. Britain, France, North America, Japan, and especially Italy are making supreme efforts to ensure markets for their armament industries. The use of their diplomatic representations, of the propaganda voyages of their most modern ships and vessels, of sending missions and also of the guaranteeing of loans and insurance against deficits are not merely to gain commercially advantageous orders for their armament industries, but first and foremost to expand their output from the point of view of military policy.

d) It is just when the efforts to do away with the restrictions imposed on us have succeeded, that the German Navy has an ever increasing and really vital interest in furthering the German Armament Industry and preparing the way for it in every direction in the competetive battle against the rest of the world.

e) If, however, the German Armament Industry is to be able to compete in foreign countries, it must inspire the confidence of its purchasers. The condition for this is that secrecy for our own ends be not carried toofar. The amount of material to be kept secret under all circumstances in the interest of the defence of the country is comparatively small. I would like to issue a warning against the assumption that, at

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the present stage of technical development in foreign industrial states, a problem of vital military importance which we perhaps have solved, has not been solved there. Solutions arrived at today, which may become known, if divulged to a third person by naturally always possible indiscretion, have often been already superceded by new and better solutions on our part, even at that time, or at any rate after the copy has been made. It is of greater importance that we should be technically well to the fore in any really fundamental matters, than that less important points should be kept secret unnecessarily and excessively.

f) To conclude: I attach particular importance to guaranteeing the continuous support of the Industry concerned by the navy, even after the present restrictions have been relaxed. If the purchasers are not made confident that something special is being offered them, the industry will not be able to stand up to the competetive battle and therefore will not be able to supply the requirements of the German Navy in case of need.

Sgn. Raeder.

Distribution:

A
B
VCM
Ing
K
Abw (by message)

(various illegible notations)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF EXCERPT FROM C-29

9 November 1945

I, ERNST M. COHN, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt from Document No. C-29.

ERNST M. COHN
33925738

H1165 - 0015

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-38
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Filed Red 15.1.46 GB 223

Seekriegsleitung
B Nr. I. SKL. I Op. 00969/41 Op. Chiefs

Berlin, 13 June 1941

: TOP SECRET! :
:THROUGH OFFICER ONLY!:

URGENT!

Vfg.

I.) To

OKW/WFST/Z

Subject: Offensive action against enemy submarines in operation "Barbarossa".

Procedure: OKW/WFH/2 (I Kop) Nr. 44590/41 Chefs. 30/4/41

- - - - - -

I. On 12 June at 2000 hours one of the two outpost patrol boats which had been carefully stationed on either side of Bornholm reported an unknown, surfacing submarine on a west-courst near Adlergrund (20 sm southwest of Bornholm). It answered recognition signal after some time with a meaningless letter signal.

II. In the opinion of the "Seekriegsleitung" there is no doubt that the enemy is starting his deployment of forces in the Baltic Sea and is also moving his submarines forward into the central Baltic Sea.

III. In the opinion of the "Seekriegsleitung" it is to be considered if orders for offensive action against these submarines could not be started immediately, or in the very near future in order to keep losses of tonnage or of men of war down as far as possible. In this connection it remains to be seen if the reported submarine or additional Russian boats are already at present carrying out mining operations or if the boats are to be used for torpedoing after the beginning of hostilities.

It is urgently requested and appears possible to release orders for this offensive action with the aim of destruction without any trace of the Soviet submarines including their crews. Radio silence which most certainly is ordered for the enemy submarines will make it more difficult if not impossible for the enemy to prematurely learn of the attack, even if the complete destruction should not be successful. If necessary it may be stated that the attack was made because it was asserted that British submarines had penetrated into the Baltic Sea.

IV. In consideration of the importance of this question an early decision is requested.

II.) Copy: (illegible) 1 2 3 4
1 Nord, Ib, LIK (junge), Gr Nord
(illegible)

III.) I Op.

H1165 - 0016

G/SKL.

1. SKL.

Ia I Op.

- - - - - - - - -

TOP SECRET

High Command of Armed Forces
(OberKommando der Wehrmacht)
No. 44 986/41 gK, Chefs. WFST/Abt.L(IOp.)

Fuehrer Headquarters,
15 June 1941.

6 copies
1st copy

Top Secret
Through officer only.

Subject: Offensive action against enemy submarines in the Baltic Sea.

Re: 1 SKL. I Op. No. 00969/41 Op.
Chefs. 13 June 1941

To
High Command of the Navy - OKM (SKL)

Offensive action against submarines south of the line Memel-southern tip of Oeland is authorized if the boats cannot be definitely identified as Swedish during the approach by German naval forces.

The reason to be given up to B-day is that our naval forces believed to be dealing with penetrating British submarines.

Chief of the German High Command

(signed) Keitel.

Distribution:

Ob.d.M. (SKL)	1st copy
Ob.d.L (Lw.Fü.St)	2d copy
WFSt	3d copy
Abt.L	
Chef/Ktb.	4th copy
I K	5th copy
I L	6th copy

- - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-38

27 November 1945.

I, GOETZ MAYER, Tec 5, 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. C-38.

GOETZ MAYER,
Tec 5, 33812169.

4 20

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-66
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Rec'd 15.1.46

SEC 24-G/C-66

(Memorandum for Admiral Assmann for his own use; not for publication. With the signature "RAEDER" and date 10 January 1944).

1. S. O. Only

a) Barbarossa.

1) At this time the Fuehrer had made known his "unalterable decision" to conduct the Eastern campaign in spite of all remonstrances. After that, further warnings, if no new situations had arisen, were found to be completely useless. As Chief of Naval War Staff I was never convinced of the "Compelling necessity" for Barbarossa.

2) During the campaign in France and also during the beginning of preparation for Seelöwe* - while the Fuehrer still had hopes of gaining control of the air, (which he too recognized as being an essential pre-requisite of Seelöwe), it was doubtless his intention after France's fall to concentrate on the Navy and Air Force. The Fuehrer described the moving of troops to the Eastern front in August to me as a large scale camouflage measure for Seelöwe. (A statement from the Supreme Command of the Army would have to be obtained on this point).

The Fuehrer very early had the idea of one day settling accounts with Russia, doubtless his general ideological attitude played an essential part in this. In 1937-38 he once stated that he intended to eliminate the Russians as a Baltic power; they would then have to be diverted in the direction of the Persian Gulf. The advance of the Russians against Finland and the Baltic States in 1939-40 probably further strengthened him in this idea.

The fear that control of the air over the Channel in the autumn of 1940 could no longer be attained - a realization which the Fuehrer, no doubt, gained earlier than the Naval War Staff, who were not so fully informed of the true results of air raids on England (our own losses) - surely caused the Fuehrer, as far back as August and September, to consider whether - even prior to victory in the West - an Eastern campaign would be feasible with the object of first eliminating our last serious opponent on the Continent. The Fuehrer did not openly express this fear, however, until well into September.

The Fuehrer's remark of 21st July 1940 is an indication of reflections of this kind (Section 68) ("It is of course our duty to give careful consideration to the question of America and Russia"); furthermore, comments such as Section 76, dated 12.8, dealing with the fortification of the North Norwegian fjords, and occasional statements regarding the meeting of Russia demands for the delivery of ships and heavy artillery, which show the Fuehrer's mistrust of the Russian attitude and his hope of evading certain comittments altogether.

* Invasion of England.

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Doubtless during September 1940 the possibility of an Eastern campaign was mentioned rather often by the Fuehrer, for I was worried lest the war should take a wrong turn (being diverted from the main danger "England"), and this caused me to have an interview with the Fuehrer, tete a tete, "even outside my own department" on 26th June 1940, concerning the significance of the Mediterranean and North Africa, after I had first made a thorough report on these questions, on September 6th, 1940. In this interview of 26 September 1940 my statement - "It is questionable whether an attack on Russia from the North is necessary", removed all doubt that there had been talk during the previous weeks of the Eastern operation. It is in keeping with the Fuehrer's usual mode of procedure for him to exercise personal reserve in the first instance in this matter vis-avis the Chief of Naval War Staff, whose concept would necessarily be a different one. In this connection the Supreme Command of the Army will be able to give fuller details, since it was primarily concerned in the preparations, and will have been addressed by the Fuehrer on the matter. I would particularly point out here- quite apart from the Eastern operation- how I have attempted to impress on the Fuehrer the decisive importance for the war of the question of the Mediterranean and North Africa (when I reported to the Fuehrer on 6.9. and 26.9.40). After the discussion on 26.9. the Fuehrer told Kapitan zur See von Puttkamer that this report had been especially valuable to him, and that he could, in the light of it, review his own opinions, and see whether he was "in the right perspective."

3) At that time, (see a 1)*, the Fuehrer was firmly resolved on a surprise attack on Russia, regardless of what was the Russian attitude to Germany, - this, according to reports coming in, was frequently changing. The communication to Matsuoka was designed entirely as a camouflage measure and to ensure surprise. Concern lest a note to Matsuoka which stated his true telling Matsuoka the whole truth. He told me so at the time at a party!

4) The expression "greatly abbreviated" describes the representations I have always made while at 1 SKL, - memorandums, whish were not so much German essays, or very exhaustive, as notes, and thus easier to put into report form. By means of the notes I could the more briefly and forcefully present this report, which without doubt gave a particularly clear and significant picture of the situation. It formed a very good supplement to and continuation of my reports made on the 6.6. and 29.6.40. The Fuehrer, whose primary interest was in the settling in motion of Barbarossa, (thus, for instance, he wanted to employ the German Air Forces principally on the Eastern Front) - naturally took a special interest in those points in connection with which fuller aid could be secured from the Italians. It would be a mistake to conclude, from the expression "greatly abbreviated", that there was "reserve" on my part on this subject, to which I have always given the greatest publicity.

* Ink Note.

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5) In view of previous statements by the Fuehrer (see Section 2), and the contrasts in ideology, I personally have always doubted that the Fuehrer believed from the very beginning that the Russo-German pact would last. I think that the pact arose solely out of the need of the moment and that the Fuehrer (-in spite of his speech in the Reichstag on 1.9.39.) in no wise intended it to be a permanent solution of the Russian problem. After the campaign against Poland he had contented himself in the first instance with a frontier line which would, with the help of an Eastern wall, afford an effective defence against Russia. In my opinion it was only later - when, on the one hand, the first successes in Russia had been gained, and on the other, when the prospects of turning North Africa to good account were fading - that it became his aim to make the feeding of Europe dependent on the Ukraine, this plan bringing with it permanent opposition to Russia. Though nothing was actually said, this would involve giving up all thought of targets for which a certain measure of sea power was required, that is, it would mean striving for a pure continental policy.

6) As under section 3). A statement such as this to the Duce should be considered merely as camouflage. The Fuehrer kept his plans most carefully secret from the Italians. I believe that Stalin is our greatest enemy - a statesman at home and abroad, a soldier and an organiser on a prodigious scale, a Titanic genius seeing far into the future. I consider it extremely probable that in 1937 and 38 Stalin came to recognize, through the efforts of the United States ambassador, as described by Davies in "Mission to Moscow", that Russia could play an important part in a subsequent conflict between the Anglo-Saxon races and Germany, and that he thereupon began to speed up his armaments. The pact with Germany was of a kind which would help him towards the realization of the first part of his scheme - Eastern Poland, the Baltic countries, Bessarabia and perhaps the Balkans and the Dardanelles. The gains of 1939/40 were indeed great. In 1940/41 Stalin had no reason to march against Germany. Germany's surprisingly great successes against France and the Balkans impressively demonstrated her strength to him and perhaps even awakened fear of her. Stalin cannot therefore have intended, to take the initiative in attacking this strong Germany in 1941, but while continuing to arm, he must have wanted to wait and see whether the subsequent course of the war between Germany and the Anglo- Saxon powers would offer him a favorable opportunity - he knew from Davies that the USA would join in sooner or later. Whether in this connection he favored a push towards the Rhine, passing through the Scandanavian countries, or to the North Atlantic, or in the direction of the Mediterranean to the Dardanelles, or through Persia to the Indian Ocean, or finally towards India, must have depended entirely on the course of the struggle between Germany and the Anglo-Saxon powers. As I see it, it does not do justice to the importance of Stalin to assume that he intended "to start the war against Germany in the autumn of 1941". It is true that an essential part of his armament was made ready for this dead-line. I have sometimes been in doubt whether, for Stalin, the ideological had not taken second place long ago in favor of a tremendous effort to use to the full the opportunity he was offered of realizing the schemes of Peter the Great. Was the announcement of the dissolution of the Comminter perhaps a hint to Germany that an understanding between Germany and Russia would have been possible even then, and that, after the Russian territories had been regained, a peaceful relationship would have been possible between the two States, who, taking the long view, are both threatened by the USA?

H1165-0019

7) As no other course is possible, I have submitted to compulsion. If, in doing so, a difference of opinion arises between 1 SKL and myself, it is perhaps because the arguments the Fuehrer used on such occasions (Dinner speech in the middle of July to the Officers in Command, to justify a step he had planned) usually had a greater effect on people not belonging to the "inner circle", than on those who often heard this type of reasoning.

Many remarks and plans indicate that the Fuehrer calculated on the final ending of the Eastern campaign in the autumn of 1941, whereas the Supreme Command of the Army (General Staff) was very sceptical.

H1165-0020

1 Chefsache
Gross Admiral Assmann, for your own personal information.

Not for distribution. Raeder. 10. 1. 44.

a) .....

b) Weser-Ubung.

The memo is wholly insufficient and does not correspond to the contents of the report. During the weeks preceding the report on 10.10.39. I was in correspondence with Admiral Carls, who, in a detailed letter to me, first pointed out the importance of an occupation of the Norwegian coasts by Germany. I passed this letter on to C/SKl for their information and prepared some notes* based on this letter for my report to the Fuehrer which I made on 10.10.39, since my opinion was identical to that of Admiral Carls, while, at that time, SKl was more dubious about the matter. In these notes, I set out the disadvantages which an occupation of Norway by the British would have for us - control of the approaches to the Baltic, flanking of our naval operations and of our air attacks on Britain, pressure on Sweden. I also mentioned the advantages for us of the occupation of the Norwegian coast-outlet to the North Atlantic, no possibility of British minefields as in the year 1917-18. Naturally at the time, only the coast and bases were considered; I included Narvik, though Admiral Carls, in the course of our correspondence, hoped that Narvik might be excluded. (At that time, we were able to use Murmansk and/or a special Russian Base.) The Fuehrer saw at once the significance of the Norwegian problem; he asked me to leave the notes and stated that he wished to consider the question himself.

In the further developments, I was supported by Korv. Kapitän Schreiber Naval Attache in Oslo and the M-chief personally - in conjunction with the Rosenberg Organization. Thus, we got in touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who came to Berlin in December and were taken to the Fuehrer by me - with the approval of Reichleiter Rosenberg.** On the grounds of the Fuehrer's discussion with Quisling and Hagelin on the afternoon of 14.12.39 the Fuehrer gave the order that preparations for the Norwegian operation were to be made by Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

Until that moment, the Naval War Staff had taken no part in the development of the Norwegian question, and, even then, they were somewhat sceptical about it. The preparations, which were undertaken by Kpt.z.S. Kranke in the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, were founded, however, on a memorandum of the Naval War Staff.

.....

* With the help of K.Adm.v.Puttkamer, these may possibly still be obtainable; I had no duplicate as I did not think I should have to give the notes up.

** At the crucial moment, R. hurt his foot, so that I visited him in his house on the morning of 14.12.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT C-66

7 December 1945.

I, KENNETH HUGH MOLESWORTH DUKE, Major R.A., hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Doc. C-66

'SGD' KENNETH HUGH MOLESWORTH
DUKE

Major R.A.

H1165-0022

(C-120/D)

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-120
Continued

ANNEX II to OKW No. 37/39 Top Secret L I

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II

"Fall Weiss"

The present attitude of Poland requires, beyond the plan "Frontier-defense East", the effecting of military preparations to exclude if necessary any threat from this direction forever.

1) Political Requirements and Aims.

German relations with Poland continue to be based on the principle of avoiding any quarrels. Should Poland, however, change her policy towards Germany, based up to now on the same principles as our own, and adopt a threatening attitude towards Germany, a final settlement might become necessary, notwithstanding the pact in effect with Poland.

The aim then will be to destroy Polish military strength, and create in the East a situation which satisfies the requirements of national defense. The Free State of Danzig will be proclaimed a part of the Reich-territory at the outbreak of the conflict, at the latest.

The political leadership considers it its task in this case to isolate Poland if possible, that is to say, to limit the war to Poland only.

The development of increasing internal crises in France and the resulting British cautiousness might produce such a situation in the not too distant future.

Intervention by Russia so far as she would be able to do this cannot be expected to be of any use for Poland, because this would imply Poland's destruction by Bolshevism.

The attitude of the Baltic States will be determined wholly by German military exigencies.

On the German side, Hungary can not be considered a certain ally, Italy's attitude is determined by the Berlin-Rome Axis.

2) Military Conclusions.

The great objectives in the building up of the German Armed Forces will continue to be determined by the antagonism of the "Western Democracies". "Fall Weiss" constitutes only a precautionary complement to these preparations. It is not to be looked upon in any way, however, as the necessary prerequisite for a military settlement with the Western opponents.

The isolation of Poland will be more easily maintained, even after the beginning of operations, if we succeed in starting the war with heavy, sudden blows and in gaining rapid successes.

The entire situation will require, however, that precautions be taken to safeguard the western boundary and the German North Sea coast, as well as the air over them.

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Against the Baltic States - Lithuania in particular,- security measures are to be carried out for the event of a Polish march through this country.

3) Tasks of the Armed Forces.

The task of the Armed Forces is to destroy the Polish Armed Forces. For this reason a surprise attack is to be striven for and prepared. The camoflaged or open general mobilisation will not be ordered earlier than the day before the attack at the latest possible moment.

The forces provided for the "Western frontier defense" (annex I "Frontier defense") must not be employed for any other purpose for the moment.

All other frontiers are to be kept under observation - the Lithuanian is to be covered.

4) Tasks of the Branches of the Armed Forces.

a) Army

The operational objective in the East is to destroy the Polish army.

For this purpose the German Armed Forces, on the southern flank, may enter Slovak territory. In the North, communication between Pomerania and East Prussia must be established quickly.

The preparations for the opening of operations are to be made in such a way, that even without waiting for the planned assembly of mobilized units, positions can be taken up immediately by the first available troops. A camoflaged assembly for those units just before the day of attack may be provided. I reserve for myself the decision in this matter.

Whether the forces provided for the "Western frontier defense" will be deployed there completely, or will be partly available for some other employment, - will depend upon the political situation.

b) Navy

The tasks of the Navy in the Baltic sea are as follows:

1) Destruction or elimination of the Polish Navy.
2) Blockade of all sea-ways to the Polish Naval bases, especially Gdynia. The neutral shipping in Polish harbours and in Danzig is to be given at the beginning of the invasion of Poland, a time limit for sailing. After its expiration, the Navy will be free to set up blockade measures.
The disadvantages for the naval warfare produced by this time limit must be accepted.
3) Suppression of the Polish maritime trade.
4) Securing of the sea-route between East Prussia.
5) Protection of German sea-communications to Sweden and Baltic States.
6) Reconnaissance and protection, as far as possible in an inconspicuous manner, against an intervention by the Soviet Navy from the Gulf of Finland.

Suitable naval forces are to be provided for defense of the coast and coastal zone of the North Sea.

In the southern part of the North Sea and in the Skagerrak measures are to be taken for precautionary protection against a surprise intervention of the Western powers. These measures are to be restricted to the absolute

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minimum. Their inconspicuousness must be assured. It is of decisive importance to avoid here any sort of action which might make the political attitude of the Western Powers more unfriendly.

c) Air Force

The whole Air Force except, for necessary forces left in the West, is to be sued for a surprise attack against Poland. Besides destruction of the Polish Air Force in the shortest time possible, - the tasks of the German Air Force are principally as follows:

1) Interference with the Polish mobilisation and prevention of planned Polish strategic concentrations.
2) Tactical support of the Army, especially support of the spear-heads starting immediately after the crossing of the frontier.

A possible transfer of flying-units to East Prussia, before beginning of operations, must not endanger surprise.

The moment of the first flight over the frontier is to be timed in coordination with the Army's operations.

Attacks against the harbour of Gdynia may be undertaken only after expiration of the time limit for sailing for the neutral ships. (See number 4 b)

Strong points of air-defense are to be set up above Stettin, Berlin and the Upper-Silesian industrial district including Maehrisch Ostrau (Moravská Ostravá) and Brunn (Brno).

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Exhibit # USA 213
Filed Jan. 15, 1946

(SEC-24.7/C-135) C-135

EXTRACT FROM HISTORY OF THE WAR ORGANISATION
AND OF THE SCHEME FOR MOBILISATION.

1. Since under the Treaty of Versailles all preparations for mobilisation were forbidden, these were at first confined to a very small body of collaborators, and were at first only of a theoretical nature. Nevertheless, there existed at that time (in the twenties):

an "Establishment Order" (Aufstellungsordnung)
Instructions for Establishment (Aufstellungsbestimmungen)

the forerunners of the present day Scheme for Mobilisation, thus:

an "Establishment Organisation" (Aufstellungsgliederung)
adaptable "Instructions for Establishment" (veränderliche Aufstellungsbestimmungen)

which were drawn up for each ..-year (cover name for Mobilisation year). They were drawn up by Administration Amtmann Heintze attached to the Fleet Division of that time (A. II).

As stated, the "Establishment Organisation(s)" of that time were to be judged purely theoretically, for they had no positive basis in the form of men and materials. They provided nevertheless a valuable foundation for the establishment of a War Organisation as our ultimate aim.

2. The crises between Germany and Poland, which were becoming increasingly acute, compelled us, instead of making theoretical preparations for war, to prepare in a practical manner for a purely German-Polish conflict.

The strategic idea of a rapid forcing of the Polish base of Gdynia was made a basis, and the Fleet on active service was to be reinforced by the auxiliary forces which would be indispensable to attain this strategic end, and the essential coastal and Flak batteries, especially those in Pillau and Swinemuende were to be taken over. Thus, in 1930, the

Reinforcement Plan (Verstärkungsplan)

was evolved, consisting of the main part, drawn from the Establishment Order,

Part A = Reinforcement Organisation (Verstärkungsgliederung)
Part B = Reinforcement Regulations (Verstärkungsbestimmungen)
Part C = (Filling of Posts for reinforcement scheme)
(Verstärkungsstellenbesetzungen)

and Parts D to F (containing special instructions with regard to Air Forces, Intelligence Service and Coastal P.A.D.)

They were drawn up by Oberleutnant zur See (retired) von Rabenau and Amtmann Heintze, under the instructions of Inspecting Officer A. II m. Korvettenkäpitan von Bonin.

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3. A fundamental change occurred when Adolf Hitler seized power. Even if the Reinforcement Plan had a positive basis in the form of men and material (it contained only batteries and auxiliary ships which were really prepared and could be made ready for service within 72 hours), the Establishment Plan with its theoretical structure still held good to meet the eventuality of the war not being concluded with the fall of Gdynia. Practical preparations for this, however, are left over till actual mobilisation.

Further, Reichschancellor Adolf Hitler had made a clear political request to build up for him in five years, i.e. by the 1.4.38., Armed Forces, which he could place in the balance as an instrument of political power.

Thus the Establishment Organisation 1938 was evolved as the provisional target of the Navy, drawn up by Oberleutnant zur See (retired) von Rabenau under the instructions of A.IIIa. (Fregattenkapitän von Bonin).

H1165 - 0027

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-141
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The Chief of Naval Command
B.Nr. A IIIb 2271/31 G.Kds (Stamp S.O.) BERLIN, 10 February 1932

To
S.O. Baltic Station, Kiel.
Fleet Command, Kiel.
Flag Officer Reconnaissance Forces.
Inspectorate of Torpedoes and Mining, Kiel. (3 Copies)
Naval Arsenal, Kiel.
S.O. North Sea Station, Wilhelmshaven (repeated)
Dockyard Wilhelmshaven (repeated)

Subject: Torpedo - Armament of E-Boats.*

"In view of our treaty obligations and the Disarmament Conference steps must be taken to prevent the 1st E-Boat-Half-Flotilla, which in a few months will consist of exactly similar newly built (E)-Boats, from appearing openly as a formation of torpedo-carrying boats (Torpedotraeger) as it is not intended to count these E-Boats against the number of torpedo-carrying boats allowed us."

I therefore order:

1.) "S2" - "S5", will be commissioned in the shipyard (Luerssen, Vegesack) without armament, and will be fitted with easily removable cover-sheet-metal on the spaces necessary for torpedo-tubes. The same will be arranged by T.M.I.** in agreement with the Naval-Arsenal, for the boat "S1" which will dismantle its torpedo--tubes, on completion of the practice shooting, for fitting on another boat.

2.) The torpedo-tubes of all S-Boats will be stored in the Naval Arsenal ready for immediate fitting. During the trial runs the torpedo-tubes will be taken on board one after the other for a short time to be fitted and for practice shooting so that only one boat at a time carries torpedo armament. For public consumption this boat will be in service for the purpose of temporary trials by the T.V.A.*** It should not anchor together with the other, unarmed, boats of the Half-Flotilla because of the obvious similarity of type. The duration of firing, and consequently the length of time the torpedo-tubes are aboard, is to be as short as possible.

3.) Fitting the torpedo--tubes on all E-Boats is intended as soon as the situation of the political control allows it.

(Signed) Raeder.

* Translator's note: E-Boat has been used for S-Boat throughout
** - ditto - : ? = Inspectorate of Torpedoes and Mining
*** - ditto - : = Technical Research Establishment

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-141

24 November 1945.

I, D. E. SHERRIFF, Second Officer, WRNS, 36482, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. C-141.

D. E. SHERRIFF,
2/O, WRNS,
36482.

H1165 - 0028

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-152
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Top military secret Read 15.1.46

Chefsache!

Naval War Staff. Only by officer!

B.Nr.1 op 355/41 g.K.

Audience of Chief of Navy with Hitler on 18 Mar. 1600 hrs.

(present: Chief of OKW, Gen.Jodl, Fregatten Kapitän von Puttkamer.)

Exam. No. 2

11.) Japan.

Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible, since the opportunity will never again be as favourable (whole English Fleet contained, unpreparedness of U.S.A. for war against Japan, inferiority of U.S. Fleet vis-a-vis the Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for this action, but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers she will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England. Germany must therefore concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore all other East Asiatic questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are thereby solved (Guam, Phillipines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).

Japan wishes if possible to avoid war against U.S.A. She can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as possible.

.....

9. Preparations for Marita.

.....

B). Personnel Position.

.....

f) The C in C of the Navy asks for confirmation that the whole of Greece will have to be occupied even in the event of a peaceful settlement. Führer: The complete occupation is a prerequisite of any settlement.

.....

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT C-152

I ERNST M. COHN, Pfc. 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document C-152.

ERNST M. COHN
Pfc.
33925738.

H1165 - 0029

Exhibit US 214
Filed Jan. 15, 1946

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT C-155
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Translated Excerpts

Berlin, 11 June 1940

Commander in Chief of the Navy
MPA Nr. 2864g

Secret

(Translator's Note: Distribution List covers two pages)

.....The most outstanding of the numerous subjects of discussion in the Officer Corps are the Torpedo position and the problem whether the Naval building programme up to Autumn 1939 envisaged the possibility of the outbreak of war as early as 1939, or whether the emphasis ought not to have been laid from the first on the construction of U-Boats.

.....If the opinion is voiced in the Officer Corps that the entire Naval building programme has been wrongly directed and that from the first the emphasis should have been on the U-Boat weapon and after its consolidation, on the large ships, I must emphasise the following matters:

The building up of the fleet was directed according to the political demands, which were decided by the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer hoped until the last moment to be able to put off the threatening conflict with England until 1944/45. At that time the Navy would have had available a fleet with a powerful U-Boat superiority and a much more favourable ratio as regards strength in all other types of ships, particularly those designed for warfare on the high seas.

The development of events forced the Navy - contrary to the expectation even of the Fuehrer - into a war, which it had to accept while still in the initial stage of its rearmament. The result is that those who represent the opinion that the emphasis should have been laid from the start on the building of the U-Boat arm appear to be right. I leave undiscussed, how far this development, quite apart from difficulties of personnel, training and dockyards, could have been appreciably improved in any way in view of the political limits of the Anglo-German Naval Treaty. I leave also undiscussed, how the early and necessary creation of an effective Air Force slowed down the desirable development of the other branches of the forces. I indicate however with pride the admirable and, in spite of the political restraints in the years of the Weimar Republic*, far-reaching preparation for U-Boat construction, which made the immensely rapid construction of the U-Boat arm both as regards equipment and personnel possible immediately after the assumption of power.

(signed) Raeder

* Translator's Note: Literal translation is "period of the System". "Systemzeit".

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF EXCERPTS OF DOCUMENT
No. C-155

12 December 1945

I, EVELYN GLAZIER, P/O, W.R.N.S., 37371, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Excerpts of Document No. C-155.

EVELYN GLAZIER
P/O, W.R.N.S.
37371

H1165 – 0030

C 155

Additional Extract to C 155

"The operations of the Navy in the occupation of Norway will for all time remain the great contribution of the Navy to this war."

4150)

H1165 - 0031

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-156
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

SEC-24.9/C-156

Copy Nr. 274

Service publication Nr. 15

Secret

The fight of the Navy against Versailles 1919 - 1935

Edited by

Captain Schüssler (Navy)

Published

by the High Command of the German Navy

Berlin 1937

M.Dv.Nr. 352

H1165 - 0032

Preface.

The object and aim of this memorandum is to draw a technically reliable picture based on documentary records and the evidence of those who took part, of the fight of the Navy against the unbearable regulations of the Peace Treaty of Versailles.

It shows, that the Reich Navy after the liberating activities of the Free Corps and of Scapa Flow did not rest, but found ways and means to lay with unquenchable enthusiasm, in addition to the building up of the 15,000-man Navy, the basis for a greater development in the future and so create by the work of soldiers and technicians the preliminary condition for a later rearmament.

It must also distinguish more clearly the services of these men, who - without being known in wide circles - applied themselves with extraordinary zeal in responsibility in the service of the fight against the Peace Treaty; thereby, stimulated by the highest feeling of duty, they risked, particularly in the early days of their fight, themselves and their positions unrestrainedly in the partially self-ordained tasks.

This compilation makes it clearer however, that even such ideal and ambitious plans can be realized only to a small degree if the concentrated and united strength of the whole people is not behind the courageous activity of the soldier. Only when the Fuehrer had created the second and even more important condition for an effective rearmament, in the co-ordination of the whole nation and in the fusion of the political, financial and spiritual powers, could the work of the soldier find its fulfilment.

The framework of this Peace Treaty, the most shameful known in world history, collapsed under the driving power of this united will.

The Editor

Villau, 20 April 1937.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-156

26 November 1945.

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, 2nd Lt., 01332102, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C-156.

GERARD SCHAEFER
2nd Lt., 01332102

H1165 – 0035

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-156
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

SEC-24.9/C-156.

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Published
by the High Command of the German Navy.
Berlin 1937.

M.Dr. Nr. 352.

Dienstschrift Nr. 15. Druf=Nr. 274

Geheim.
Der Kampf der Marine
gegen Versailles
1919-1935.
Bearbeitet von
Kapitan zur See Schüssler.
Herausgegeben
von Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine
M.Dv.352. Berlin 1937.

PAGE 7 CHAPTER 1.

First defensive actions against execution
of the treaty of Versailles.
(From the end of the War until the occupation
of the Ruhr 1923)

Erfte Abwehrhandlungen gegen die Durchfuhrung
des Vertrages von Versailles.
(Von Kriegsende bis zum Ruhreinbruch 1923)

The World War was lost. The cruel terms of an armistice , which was unique in world history, weighed heavily upon a navy, of which the development was thereby thrown back for decades, and were carried out reluctantly by the few disciplined soldiers. A forced peace treaty was to bring new crushing terms.

The fluctuations in German history throughout the course of centuries have shown that the German was always strongest when he was worst off. The active bearers of the naval traditions trod with unbroken spirit and far from despairing in the future, the difficult road which lead them upwards from that moment when they had decided to carry on.

The same esprit de corps, which lead to the development of the Freikorps as the nucleus for personnel replacement, and which was able to maintain and use as training establishments the aged shipping left to us, this same spirit animated those German men called upon to carry out the peace treaty who in a quiet but tenacious struggle with the enemy control commissions, tried to keep valuable material for the German people and to save it for a better future.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF
EXCERPT OF DOCUMENT C-156.

23 October 1945.

I, KENNETH DUKE, Major, R.A.,109907, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of an excerpt of Document No. C-156.

KENNETH DUKE.
Major. R.A.
109907.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-156
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

SEC-24.9/C-156.

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Herausgegeben.
vom Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine

M.Dv.362. Berlin 1937.

CHAPTER 2, SECTION 7, PAGE 65.

Economic Re-armament.
Wirtschaftliche Aufrüstung

The founding of "Tebeg".

The need to investigate the possibility of creating and supplementing the arms procurement for the navy in the event of a war lead early in 1925 to the founding of Tebeg (Technical Advise and Procurement Incorporated Limited) at the instigation of the departmental chief of BW(?) Commodore Hansen, after valuable preliminary work had been performed since 1923 by Ministerialamtmann Dr. Schimpf at the direction of Commodore Gladisch.

Director and co-workers.

The Tebeg whose stocks were owned by the Navis Incorporated Limited, a Lohmann foundation (see II 3 a), was housed in a building at Lützowufer 3 which was also bought by Captain Lohmann. Its name was merely a cover name. In reality it was a concealed branch office of the naval command staff which was not able to carry out the measures forbidden by the Versailles Treaty in those days of external weakness and disinterest in military questions. The direction of the company was given to Commander (inretirement) Goehle, a naval officer, successful in peace as well as in war especially as the commander of the 9th Destroyer Flotilla at Skagerrak. His co-workers were Lieutenant (in retirement) von dan Borne, Marinebaurat(?) (in retirement) Hey, and Naval Chief Paymaster (in retirement) Habicht, later on as liaison officer with the Army Department of Armament there was Commander (in retirement) Lawrence.

Task of Tebeg.

The task of Tebeg was to investigate the raw material position, to study the industrial production potential, the supply of manpower, and in connection with this all other questions of war economy such as fuel, power, communications and transportation possibilities, and to examine the possibilities of imports from abroad and the question of building up of stocks. By a careful planning of the measures of war economy and a systematic preparation of production in the event of war, the necessary supply of ships and vehicles, weapons, ammunition and

H1165 - 0036

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other war materials was to be secured and the errors made during the period before and at the beginning of the war avoided. To sum up: The goal was the preparation of the planned mobilization of the armament industry.

The task of Tebeg was not easy. Areas rich in raw materials had been lost by Germany. The German armament industry was totally destroyed and those armament plants which were left in operation by the enemy alliance, were still, at the beginning of Tebeg's work in 1925, occupied by its control agencies and the number of available and trained skilled workers was decreasing steadily on account of unemployment.

Difficult Working Conditions.

There were often many external difficulties besides those for Tebeg: the concealment of task and work, the distance from the Naval Command Staff, the impossibility of settling any questions even of minor importance by telephone, and the necessity of avoiding if possible any written correspondence and of carrying it out in any case as private correspondence with false names and disguised expressions.

The director and his co-workers had furthermore neither office nor official orders. They had to be carefully installed by men of confidence, could only confer with confidential persons who had been selected carefully and with difficulty, they came and left as private persons, and relied entirely upon goodwill and voluntary co-operation. It must be acknowledged that the co-operation of the industry was vouchsafed in a far reaching manner and with few exceptions with very understanding willingness, that a happy collaboration with the different organisations of industry and with those branches of the army working in the same direction emerged, and that the job was especially aided by the sections and departmental chiefs of the Naval Command Staff in the clear understanding of the importance of the task.

Dissolution of Tebeg.

When, during the winding up of the Lohmann affair, the dissolution of the Navis Incorporated Limited took place the Tebeg was also dissolved in the middle of 1928 and was openly taken over as an economic group by the Naval Command Staff. The financing of its work, which had to be carried on secretly, took place as formerly by special funds which from 1928 were accounted for in a secret budget (see part III). This group was later changed into the Department of Economics and since 1936 is being run as the Department of War Economy of the Commander in Chief of the Navy.

Rear Admiral (in retirement) Goehle.

In the successful execution of the work connected with war economy, special merit was earned by the director, Commodore (E) Goehle, who has just retired as Rear Admiral. With great farsightedness and a magnificent grasp of the task set, with a tenacious and never tiring energy, unwaveringly conscious of his goal he directed Tebeg for 11 years and 2 months. He developed out of the small camouflaged "Black" limited company the Department of War Economy of the High Command of the Navy which has become an important link in the Naval organisation.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF
EXCERPT OF DOCUMENT C-156.

23 October 1945.

I, KENNETH DUKE, Major, R.A., 109907, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of an excerpt of Document No.C-156.

KENNETH DUKE,
Major, R.A.,
109907.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-156.
OFFICE OF THE U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

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M. Dr. Nr. 352

Dienstschrift Nr. 15. Brief = Nr 274.

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Berlin 1937.

M. Dv. Nr. 352 -

CHAPTER IV PAGE 75.

Concealed Rearmament under the Leadership of
the Government of the Reich.
(From 1933 until military freedom in 1935).

IV. Aufrüstung unter Führung der Reichs=
regierung in getarnter Form.

(Von 1933 bis zur Wehrfreiheit 1935).

The unification of the whole nation which was combined with the taking over of power on the 30th of January 1933 was of decisive influence on the size and the shape of further rearmament. While the second chamber (Reichsrat) approached its dissolution and withdrew as a legislative body, the Reichstag assumed a composition which could only take a one sided attitude towards the re-armament of the Armed Forces.

The Government took over the management of the re-armament programme upon this foundation.

Development of the Armed Forces.

This taking over of the management by the Reich Government developed for the Armed Forces in such a manner that the War Minister, General v. Blomberg, and through him the three branches of the Armed Forces received far reaching powers from the Reich Cabinet for the development of the Armed Forces. The whole organisation of the Reich was included in this work. In view of these powers the collaboration of the former inspecting body in the management of the secret expenditure was from then on dispensed with. There remained only the inspecting duties of the Accounting Office of the German Reich.

Independance of the Commander in Chief of
the Navy.

The Commander in Chief of the Navy, Admiral Raeder, (honorary Doctor), had received hereby a far reaching independence in the building and development of the Navy. This was only hampered insofar as the previous concealment of re-armament had to be continued in consideration of the Versailles Treaty.

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Beside the public budget there remained the previous special budget, which was greatly increased in view of the considerable credits for the provision of labor which were made available by the Reich. Wide powers in the handling of these credits were given to the Director of the Budget Department of the Navy, up to 1934 Commodore Schüssler afterwards Commodore Förste. These took into consideration the increased responsibility of the Chief of the Budget.

Declaration of military freedom.

When the Führer, relying upon the strengthening of the Armed Forces executed in the meanwhile, announced the restoration of the military sovereignty of the German Reich the last mentioned limitation in re-armament works, namely the external camouflage was eliminated. Freed from all the shackles which have hampered our ability to move freely on and under water, on land and in the air for 1½ decades, and carried by the newly awakened fighting spirit of the whole nation, the Armed Forces and as part of it the Navy can lead with full strength towards its completion the re-armament already under way with the goal of securing for the Reich its rightful position in the world.

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I, KENNETH DUKE, Major, R.A., 109907, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of an excerpt of Document No. C-156.

KENNETH DUKE,
Major, R.A.,
109907.

H1165 - 0039

Filed
Read 15.1.46
GB 230

SEC-24.9/C-161. C.161.

Extract from a memorandum by Raeder dated 10.1.43, and entitled "The Importance of German Surface Forces for the conducting of the War by the powers signatory to the Three Power Pact".

. . . . . p.5.

"In recognition of these causes, and of the technical progress achieved in the meantime, it was planned by the leaders of the National Socialist Reich to give the German Navy by 1944/45 such a strength that it would be possible to strike at the British vital arteries in the Atlantic with sufficient ships, fighting power and range.

In 1939, the war having begun five years earlier,+ the construction of these forces was still in its initial stages. After the outbreak of war - in order to favour a rapid increase in the number of U-Boats - only those ships were made ready which were already on the verge of completion, because the construction of big ships is the work of years. The building of the three big ships was stopped.

+ Translator's Note: implying 5 years earlier than intended (Trans)

(3544)

H1165 - 0040

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-166
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

COMMAND OFFICE
OF THE NAVY.

BERLIN, 12 March 1934.

A II c 47134 Gkdos.

TOP SECRET.

SUBJECT: Preparation of Auxiliary Cruisers

Reference: A II c 5937/33 G.Kdos.
BB 8800/33 G.Kdos.

It is intended to include in the Establishment Organization 35 (AG = Aufstellungsgliederung) a certain number of auxiliary cruisers which are intended for use in operations on the High Seas.

In order to disguise the intention and all the preparations the ships will be referred to as "Transport ships O". It is requested that in future this designation only be used....."

..12) The preparations are to be arranged so that they can be completed by 1.4.35.

..13) A*request to be kept in constant touch with the preparations.

A (Signed in draft) GROOS.

* A Branch of the Naval War Staff.

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CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-166

15 November 1945.

I, BETTY D. RICHARDSON, P/O, W.R.N.S., 66370, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document C-166.

BETTY D. RICHARDSON
P/O, W.R.N.S.,
66370.

H1165 - 0041

Read 15.1.46
US 136

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-170
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

1) A 1,13 25 Aug

The already started "Incident Weiss will be stopped at 2030 hours because of changed political conditions". (Close Friendship Pact England/Poland of 25 Aug noon, and information from Duce, that he would be true to his word, however, having to ask necessarily for large supply of raw materials.)

2) 31 Aug

Decision for opening hostilities against Poland. Falls at 1240 hours.

3) A 1,95 17 Sept

Russian entry into Poland is valued by Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) as an event of the most far-reaching importance, the resulting possible effect for Germany of this must be estimated as being especially favorable.

4) C VII/39,9 23 Sep

Navy Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Navy Supreme Commander for the first time studies the question of Russia's participation in a) the cession of submarines, b) the outfitting of auxiliary cruisers (MURMANSK), c) the calling at Russian ports - Fuehrer will commission the foreign office with clarification of the questions.

5) A 1,163 25 Sep

There is no doubt about Russia's honest attitude. Russian government is convinced of the necessity of cooperation with Germany (Naval Attache Moscow, BL.186, 27 Sep)

6) C VIII/39,86 28 Sep

Conclusion of German-Russian border and friendship pact (compare introduction)

7) A 2,28 3 Oct

Naval Supreme Commander orders examination of the possibilities of support by Russia for German naval warfare, to be forwarded to the foreign office. Foreign minister believes, that far-reaching support may be expected - Bases (STUTZPUNKTE) in Norway with Russian help.

8) A 2,50 5 Oct

Threatening situation of German (Auslandsdeutsche) living in Estonia and Latvia, because of Russian demands - "The increase of Russian influence in the Baltic States is happening with the full accord of German political policy." The evacuation of Germans (Auslandsdeutsche), planned by the foreign office, with steamers and men-o'-war was not approved by the Fuehrer in agreement with the naval supreme command, since the situation is not as yet clear, and since the impression of misunderstandings between Russia and Germany must be avoided under all circumstances. On 6 Oct, calmer appraisal of the situation. Naval Supreme Commander orders on 9 Oct lifting of the alert for the planned actions.

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9) C VII/39,11 10 Oct

Navy Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Russia has offered a well situated base (Stützpunkt) near Murmansk (Compare BL.23). One auxiliary cruiser in Murmansk for outfitting. Naval Supreme Commander points out value of the winning of Norwegian bases (Drontheim) with the aid of Russian pressure. Fuehrer promises examination; refuses request to build or buy submarines in Russia for political reasons.

10) A 2,93 11 Oct

English-Russian trade agreement (lumber for rubber and zinc). Rubber and zinc via Russia just as important for Germany as lumber for England. Export of Russian lumber will take place on English or neutral ships from Murmansk, so that German interference remains possible. No damage intended at all by Russia against German economic warfare. (BL 170, 21 Oct)

11) A 2,95 17 Oct

Conference of Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) with Naval Attaché Moscow, discloses that far-reaching Russian support, as expected by Chief, Naval Operations (SKL). Repair of warships, outfitting of auxiliary cruisers at Russian yards - is not possible because of political and technical reasons. Preparations for "Base North /Basis Nord/" are in progress. Attaché requests the immediate stoppage of espionage (Nachrichtenbeschaffung) against Russia through neutral states, to prevent Russian distrust.

12) A 2,193 24 Oct

Russia will fulfill in full accord with Germany's policy all treaty obligations; she will not permit active hostile position of Turkey against us or passage of English and French warships through the Dardanelles (Report Ambassador Ritter).

13) A 2,203 25 Oct

Departure of German vessels from Murmansk; English and other ships are kept back by the Russians, until the German ships are safe.

14) A 2,205 20 Oct

Sharp Russian note against English blockade warfare.

15) C VIII 39,162 26 Oct

Opinion of the Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) of the Russian wishes for the delivery of war material. Russian economic help is of decisive importance for us. Offer was made in such a generous form, that success of the English economic blockade appears impossible. Accordingly, generous reciprocation required from the German side as well.

16) C VIII/39,164,173 26 Oct

At the suggestion of Molotov, who has mentioned political apprehension concerning the appearance of German warships in the Finnish Gulf, German economic warfare is restricted in the Baltic to West of 30° East; Chief of Naval Operations (SKL) does not consider himself bound to this for the entire future (also, A 2,217).

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17) A 2,249 31 Oct

Foreign Political speech by Molotov: permanent friendship between Russia and Germany; sharp attacks against English blockade "in violation of International law".

18) C VIII/39,175 FF 2 Nov

The behaviour of the Russian Naval Command is generally cordial and cooperative. ("Base North /Basis Nord/", provisioning of merchantmen in Murmansk, aid in the return "Bremen"). Naval Supreme Commander finds himself repeatedly in a position to express his appreciation for that to the Russian Navy. Statement of the Russian naval commissar on occasion of the presentation of the communication from Naval Supreme Commander: "His answer would not consist of empty words, but actions, and only after their execution would he forward a reply to the supreme commander." (Compare C VIII/39 BL 177, 200,203).

19) A 3,5 4 Nov

Demand of Russian economic delegation on delivery of ship hulls "Seyolitz", "Lützow", continued construction with German help. Naval Supreme Commander basically desires greatest cooperation, however, rejects delivery of Seyolitz and decrease of our own building program in favor of assistance to Russia. Ship hull "Lützow" will be made available. (C VII/39,26).

20) C VII 39,34 10 Nov.

Supreme Naval Commander with the Fuehrer: Fuehrer rejects purchase of Russian submarines again, since he is convinced, that the Russian ships are in bad condition. and that the Russians "should not see any weakness with us".

22) C VII/39,43 25 Nov

Situation conference of the Naval Supreme Commander in a session of department heads (Amtschefsitzung): Russia not able to act at the present time; as long as Stalin in the government, a positive attitude certain. Changes are possible after years of inner strengthening, especially in the event of the overthrow or death of Stalin. The expansion of Russian interests in the direction of the Gulf of Persia is supported by Germany. Northern states under the pressure Germany/Russia neutral. - Southeastern states under the pressure Russia neutral. - Germany in the East has no military ties. "For the first time in 50 years a one-front war is possible."

23) A 3,265 30 Nov

Begin of hostilities between Russia and Finland.

24) A 4,13 3 Dec

Declaration by Molotov that the primary goals of Russia lie in South-Eastern Europe and on the Black Sea. Rapid solution of the Finnish problem is to be attempted to free Russian forces for other missions.

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25) A 4,45 7 Dec

High Russian armament demands in return for economic aid, from the Navy among others "Lützow", "Seydlitz", "Prince Eugen". According to the Fuehrer's decision, own armament may not be retarded under any circumstance. Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) considers besides "Lützow" the delivery of plans for new construction and sample pieces.

26) C VII/39,49,56 8 Dec

Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Further sales of ships to Russia: Fuehrer rejects sale of "Seydlitz" and "Prinz Eugen" and towers of "H" nd "J". Naval Supreme Commander recommends delivery of "Bismarck" plans. Fuehrer reserves decision for himself. (Compare also A 4,60). - - Moral burden for Germany as a result of Russian-Finnish conflict.

27) C VII/39,58 12 Dec

Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Naval Supreme Commander desires a correct stand-in the Russian-Finnish conflict; no support for Finland (by way of unreliable burden); advocates favoring Russia: points out the advantages offered by Russia. Increase of anti-German, pro-English feeling in Norway because of Russian-Finnish conflict. In several circles, the opinion exists that the partition of Norway between Russia and Germany has already been agreed upon (BL 68)

28) A 4,85 12 Dec

Return "Bremen" from Murmansk - Valuable Russian assistance.

29) C VIII/39, 248 FF 14 Dec

Incident between Russian naval units and German steamers. (Details and settlement see A 4, BL.86,87,129).

30) A 4,199 17 Dec

Chief, Naval Operations concludes from the weakness of Russian fighting power, as revealed in Finland, for our own attitude against Russia. . . . . "not to over estimate in German actions and decisions the still noticeable impact of the colossus Soviet Russia - an impact that is noticeable despite the existence of the pact of friendship; but on the contrary to throw into the scale in all negotiations, the military and political strength of Germany - perhaps even more so than has been done in the past."

31) C VII 39,68 30 Dec

Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Naval Supreme Commander reports: Settlement of incidents during Russian Naval warfare against Finland (compare C VIII/39,248 FF) - Negotiation with Russia for the use of the Siberian sealanes by German warships; no difficulties anticipated. (BL.85)

32) A 4,225 31 Dec

Evaluation of the Red Army by the German General Staff: In quantity a gigantic military instrument. - Commitment of the "mass". - Organization, equipment and means of leadership unsatisfactory - principles of leadership good; leadership itself, however, too young and inexperienced. - Communication

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system bad, transportation bad; - troops not very uniform; no personalities - simple soldier good natured, quite satisfied with very little. Fighting qualities of the troops in a heavy fight, dubious. The Russian "mass" is no match for an army, with modern equipment and superior leadership.

33) A 5,62 10 Jan

German-Russian economic negotiations continue satisfactorily. Strong Russian interest in Naval deliveries. -- "Lützow", heavy turrets, "Tirpitz" plans, naval instruments. - Naval Supreme Commander decides that compliance must depend basically upon the extent of our being dependent upon Russian shipments.

34) A 5,82 12 Jan

Chief Naval Operations (SKL) attaches importance to the utilization of the Siberian sealanes which also serve Russian economic interests. (Compare BL.153, 19 Jan)

35) A 5,205 15 Jan

Difficulties in German-Russian trade negotiations, because Russian government demands "reciprocal assistance" - that is to say: no performance without contemporaneous corresponding German performance.

36) C VII/40,91 26 Jan

Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Fuehrer desires delay of delivery of ship hull "Lützow" and construction plans "Bismarck" as long as possible; hopes with favorable course of war, "to get out of it all together."

37) A 6,49 6 Feb

Favorable report of Naval Attaché Moscow on Siberian sealane; utilization by auxiliary cruiser also considered "Ship 45")

38) A 6,89 11 Feb

Conclusion of German-Russian trade agreement.

39) C VII/40,93 23 Feb

Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Naval Supreme Commander proposes - now that the Russian trade agreement has been concluded - change of the 20° East limitation for German naval warfare in the Baltic (compare No. 16 above), (also look further under No. 43).

40) C VII/40,103 9 Mar

Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Naval Supreme Commander suggests to inform the Russians during the occupation of Norway that Tromsö is not occupied by the Germans which will be considered by the Russians as recognition for their interests. "Better, the Russians sit in 'Tromsö' than the English". Fuehrer prefers to have the Russians "not to sit so close", believes that Tromsö also should be occupied by us.

41) A 7,97 13 Mar

On 12 Feb - Peace Russia - Finland.

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42) A 7,218 29 Mar

Speech by Molotov, contains sharp criticism of Anglo-French war policy and affirmation of the friendly relations Russia/ Germany.

43) C VIII/40,159 1 Apr

Fuehrer orders that wishes of the Chief Naval Operations (SKL) for lifting of the 20° East border for warfare in the Baltic will no longer be pressed for political reasons.

44) C VIII/40,169 5 Apr

/According to an attaché report/ the temporary limitations in the use of "Base North /Basis Nord/" - tanker "Jan Wellem" and Molotov's attitude of refusal in the question of the use of a far-eastern base /Stützpunkt/ are to be traced back to the present Russian nervousness because of the future position of England and France toward Russia. (Compare A 8,38)

45) C VIII/40,180 10 Apr

Russia declares herself disinterested in the Norway action; shows understanding for German measures.

46) A 8,154 16 Apr

Tension and border incidents between Roumania and Russia.

47) A 8,231 22 Apr

Russian inventions for the incorporation of the border states becomes recognizable.

48) A 9,2 1 May

English efforts for a trade agreement with Russia. Russian government unfavorable; she cannot discuss in any way limitations of its exports to other countries (compare also BL. 198 20 May).

49) C VIII/40,256 18 May

Auxiliary cruiser warfare in the Black Sea: Desires of the Chief, Naval Operations postponed because of unfavorable attitude of foreign office - deference to Russia, Balkan States, Turkey. (Compare also BL.281)

50) A 9,210 21 May

According to report of Ambassador in Moscow, very positive position of the Russian press to the German successes of war (compare BL.21,270: Uneasiness because of German victory cannot be found).

51) A 9,242 24 May

Tension Russia/Roumania: Uneasiness with regard to Russian entry into Bessarabia.

52) A 9,285 28 May

Bessarabian question: In the opinion of the foreign office, Russia is prepared for taking a hand in the Balkans, but for the time being no action is to be expected (Compare A 10,103)

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53) A 9,295 29 May

Russia refuses to receive the English special plenipotentiary for trade negotiations, Sir Stafford Cripps. (CR becomes later British Ambassador in Moscow - A 10,53).

54) C VII/40,221 4 June

Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Fuehrer describes as his further goal: after the defeat of France, reduction of the army, discharge of the older age classes especially skilled workers. Emphasis on air corps and navy. No talk about Russia as yet.

55) A 10,43 5 June (Remark of B.)

Estimate of situation by Chief, Naval Operations: Russia keenly appreciates German military successes, however, she fears after decisive victory by Germany, German attack against Russia. But allied victory is not desired either. Active participation of Russia in the war is entirely out of the question because of military weakness and inner-political unstability. Stalin definitely determined not to sacrifice himself for the allies. Official policy of Russia toward Germany still absolutely correct. However, possibility of an attempt, to sabotage slowly the economic cooperation is not out of the question. Because of apprehensiveness of further development of the relationships to Germany, Russia considers further expansion of bases in the Baltic indicated; pressure on Lithuania, Estonia points to the attempted full domination of this area.

56) A 10,106 10 May

Naval Attaché, Moscow reports noticeable cooling off and technical difficulties on the part of the Russians; sees for that in apprehensiveness over English attitude in case of too strong leanings toward Germany and over German attack after victory over the western powers.

57) A 10,125 12 June

Russian demands on Lithuania; situation critical

58) A 10.157 15 June

Russian ultimatum, followed by entry into Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia - This development in the opinion of Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) was to be expected for some time.

59) A 10,197 19 June

Official notification about operations in the Baltic by Molotov was to "end all intrigues, by which the western powers had attempted in the Baltic states, to sow distrust between Russia and Germany."

60) A 10,270 20 June FF

Russian entry into Bessarabia imminent. By intervention of German Government and German pressure on Roumania, peaceful settlement was reached by cession of Bessarabia and North Boucovenia. (29 June).

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C VIII/40,359 28 June

Chief, Naval Operations describes Russian action as "expected for some time". - In one German note to Russia on 22 June 41, it is said: "The German Ambassador in Moscow declares to the Soviet government that the decision comes to the Reich cabinet (Reichsregierung) 'entirely unexpectedly'".

61) A 11,50 5 July

In the Balkans further Russian advances with the goal of turning the land to Bolshevism feared.

62) A 11,62 6 July

Penetration of the Baltic by Bolshevism.

63) A 11,81 8 July

Contrary to contradictory foreign reports the foreign office emphasizes correct behaviour of Russian government toward Germany.

64) A 11,108 10 July

Russia desires closer relationships with Bulgaria and further advances in the Balkans with Bulgarian help. Bulgaria remaining reserved as well as Roumania looking to Germany for support. Increasing Russian influence in Yugoslavia - Russian advances against Iran.

64a) C VII/40,226 11 July

Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Naval Supreme Commander requests timely notification in case of complications in the East to be able to protect the undefended Baltic coast against surprise actions.

65) A 11,153 14 July

Quietening in the Balkans after conclusion of the Munich negotiations between Germany/Italy/Hungary.

66) A 11,153 14 July

In cooperation with Russia preparations for the departure of "Ship 45" by the Siberian Sealane: (Compare BL.117)

67) A 11,235 21 July

Baltic States declare merger (Anschluss) with Russia.

68) C VII 40,251 21 July

Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Fuehrer lectures:

a) on America
b) on Russia, whose entry into the war, especially because of the aerial threat to Germany, could be very pleasant. Even though Russia views Germany's great successes with tears in her eyes, she herself has no intention to enter the war against Germany. It is naturally a duty to weigh the American and Russian question seriously. Rapid waging of war is in the German interest; but there is no urgent

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need for it. Material is plentiful, food supply is secure. The fuel situation is the most difficult, but as long as Roumania and Russia deliver, and hydro-electric works can be safeguarded against air attacks, it is not critical.

69) A 11,249 22 July

New demands by Russia on Finland.

70) A 11,281 23 July

Conference Stalin-Cripps: English attempt to split Russia away from Germany failed completely. According to Stalin's opinion, German successes do not threaten Russia. Relationships between Germany and Russia rest on fundamentals of national interests of both countries. Russia objects to England's intervention in her foreign trade. No power can claim exclusive leadership in the Balkan states; Russia also does not claim that. Russia objects to exclusive role of Turkey in the Black Sea and the Straits (compare political overall picture 170/40).

71) A 11,350 28 July

Rumor about Russian ultimatum to Finland untrue according to foreign office. However, Molotov has complained about the anti-Russian attitude in Finland. Undoubtedly tried to influence the Finnish government to facilitate a later coordination (Gleichschaltung)

72) A 12,1 1 Aug

Speech by Molotov. Corresponds to speech referred to in No. 70: "Removed for Germany friction points in the East, and created assured certainty in the East" - but according to C VIII/40,407 threats against Finland.

75) A 12,41 4 Aug

According to Naval Attaché in Helsinki - depressed mood in Finland; hope that one day Germany would bring help to Finland after all.

74) A 12,143 12 Aug

Departure "Ship 45" Via Siberian sealane with Russian assistance.

75) A 12,149 13 Aug

Turkish anxiety because of Russian advances against Dardanelle and Roumania.

76) C VII/40,270 13 Aug

Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Fuehrer desires stronger fortification of the North Norwegian Fjords, so that attacks by the Russians (!) these according to A 12, 150 in case of a new conflict Russia - Finland - would be hopeless.

77) A 12,301 20 Aug

Evaluation of Russian long distance aims by Chief Naval Operations (SKL): Ice, free North-Atlantic port. Advance

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through the Balkans for the annexation of the Dardanelles and the domination of the Black Sea. Advance through Iran to the Persian Gulf. Strong pressure on Finnish internal policies. Subversive creation of disturbances. In Rumania, especially in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, panslavic-communist propaganda - partially successful. Strong activities by agents in Greece. Demands on Turkey unknown. Force of arms not expected at present. Russian behavior strongly dependent on further development of war. The political weight of the Axis should keep the peace of the Balkans. Economic deliveries by Russia are good beyond expectations. (Compare C VIII/40,461).

78) A 12,372 31 Aug

Russia reinforces troops on the Finnish border because of tense situation.

79) T.P.

In August 1940, begin of transfer of German troops to the Eastern border (according to proclamation of the Fuehrer of 22 June 1941 - T.P. of 23 June 1941).

To No. 79 compare directive of Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW) of 27 Aug 40 in documents "See Lowe", directives of OKW I, 1 Volume, 1 Leaf 26: Transfer of 10 Divisions and 2 Armored Divisions to the Government General for the possibility of a necessary rapid action in the interest of a protection of the Rumanian oil fields.

80) A 13,102 8 Sept

Russian annoyance and supposed deterioration of the relationship with Germany as a result of the Vienna arbitration (Wiener Schiedsspruch) (30 Aug) with the border guarantee of Rumania directed mainly against Russia, and as a result of the uncertainty of German Eastern policy. Both is considered as merely temporary by the Germans. (Compare also A 12,352 and C VIII/40,488) F.

81) A 13,119 10 Sept

Since "Base North /Basis Nord/" is no longer needed after the occupation of Norway, appreciation by the Reich cabinet (Reichsregierung) and note of appreciation by Naval Supreme Commander for valuable Russian assistance, Russian government declares that they are satisfied that they could be of use to us. (Compare C VIII/40 BL 464/501).

82) A 13,155 12 Sept

Lecture by Naval Attaché in Moscow: Russian attitude, which was very reserved at the beginning, is now markedly friendly; reason for change not clearly understandable. Attaché emphasizes the obliging assistance at the departure "Ship 45" by the Siberian sealane - see also BL. 159,237 - relates valuable observations on the good progress of the Russian Naval rearmament: numerous destroyers, submarines 2000 tons, three battle ships under construction in Leningrad; thus obvious connection to Russian demands for 2 sets of 38 cm double turrets.

83) A 13,196 14 Sept

Conference Naval Attaché in Tokyo with former Japanese Ambassador in Rome (Shiratori). Ambassador: Ambassador does not

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believe in a long duration of the German-Russian understanding, hopes for the joining of Germany with Japan for the destruction of Russia.

84) C VIII/40,516 18 Sept

Anti-German propaganda in the Red Army. Assumption of German intentions to attack and thesis of the inevitable German-Russian conflict. (Compare A 13,221. Distrust in the Supreme Soviets; Molotov expresses calming reassurances: "everything has been done for the security of the Russian western border")

85) A 13,349 26 Sept

Official Russian newspaper article emphasizes that Russia stands outside the present fight for the Balkan peninsula "true to its peace and neutrality policy". Contrary to that, according to reports of the German Ambassador in Moscow, there is no doubt about the very strong Russian interest in the Balkans, where "nothing can be decided without Russia".

86) C VII/40,285 26 Sept

Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Naval Supreme Commander presents his opinion about the situation: the Suez Canal must be captured with German assistance. From Suez advance through Palestine and Syria; then Turkey in our power. The Russian problem will then assume a different appearance. Russia is fundamentally frightened of Germany. It is questionable whether action against Russia from the North will then be still necessary. (Thus such an action must have been considered in the meantime: Remark of D.)

Fuehrer agrees to these decisions. Russia will be induced to advance in the direction of Persia, India in order to find there an outlet to the ocean that could be more important for Russia than the position in the Baltic. They too were of the opinion that Russia was seriously afraid of Germany's strength, he considers Russian-Finnish entanglements this year improbable.

87) 27 Sept

Conclusion of the Three Power Pact.

88) C VIII/40,549 29 Sept

Three Power Pact: Russian government sees in the treaty a recognition of Russian neutrality and peace policy (Compare A 14,1: Russian press brings very favorable comments, emphasizes adherence to present policy).

89) C VIII 40,561 6 Oct

Noticeable relaxation of tension between Finland and Russia. (Compare A 14,49)

90) A 14,71 7 Oct

England attempts to bring about cooling off of German-Russian relationship by negotiations Cripps/Molotov.

91) A 14,15 11 Oct

German entry into Rumania: England attempts, by alarming

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reports to influence Russia's attitude toward Germany, however, no signs of change of Russian attitude noticeable.

92) A 14,214 19 Oct

According to report by the German Ambassador in Moscow, the slight deterioration of German-Russian relationship - especially caused as the result of transit of German troops through Finland - appears to have been alleviated again. "Renunciation by Moscow of interference in Balkan interests permits very well the possibilities of compensation in other areas."

93) A 14,360 30 Oct

Russia's attitude with regard to the Italian-Greek conflict (start 28 Oct) does not give rise to any anxiety. Russia will continue to form the near protection of the Europe-bloc. Economic deliveries run according to plan. Increasing relaxation of tension between Russia/Japan.

94) A 14,361 30 Oct

"OST FALL" (East case) - this word appears for the first time in the documents (Remark of B) - in the present development of the situation is no longer considered likely. Readiness for defense and preparations in armaments continue at an increased speed nevertheless.

95) C VII/40,147 4 Nov

Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Fuehrer expects in case of advance in the Balkans for the support of Italy-Russia's neutrality. Question is to be talked over with Molotov in the near future. Preparations for an Eastern incident (OST FALL) are to be continued.

96) C VIII/40,111 5 Nov

Anti-British position by Moscow in the question of the Danube Commission.

97) C VIII/40,624 10 Nov

Begin of negotiations with Molotov in Berlin

98) C VII/40,162 14 Nov

Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Fuehrer is "still inclined" to instigate the conflict with Russia. Naval Supreme Commander recommends putting it off until the time after the victory over England since there is heavy strain on German forces and the end of warfare not in sight.

According to the opinion of the Naval Supreme Commander Russia will not press for a conflict within the next year, since she is in the process of building up her Navy with Germany's help - 38 cm turrets for battle ships, etc; - thus during these years she continues to be dependent upon German assistance.

99) A 15,199 16 Nov

Regarding conclusion of Molotov's visit: Satisfactory course of the negotiations. At first no fixed treaty: Russia apparently ready to join the Three Power Pact after the clarification of several further questions. In detail: Finland-

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problem. "Careful" question by Molotov in respect to annexation of Finland by Russia. German standpoint declining, but ready for concessions in respect to exploitation of Petsamo-Nickel. Poland-problem not discussed. Balkans: Notification of Molotov on contemplated German action for the support of Italy; no objections by the Russians. Molotov's suggestion to create the possibility for Russian influence in Bulgaria similar to the German one in Rumania; not entered into by the Germans; however, Germany disclosed disinterest about Turkish domination of the Dardanelles and understanding for Russian desires to own bases there; also for the regaining of the Kars-Ardahan areas from Turkey; in this sense, joint pressure on Turkey. Molotov agreeable to examination of the suggestion (compare in this connection the deviating description of this issue in the German note to Russia, 22 June 41 - T.P. of 23 June -) Iran: German disinterest; Russians very reserved on this question. Japan: Molotov ready for understanding; however, first, thorough discussion of all problems, affecting both countries.

100) A 16,110 9 Dec

It is claimed that Russia has expressed desires for guarantee in Bulgaria. Bulgarian attitude (Report of German Embassy) disinclined.

(Translation note: the following Fuehrer directive is on a separate sheet, but should follow immediately after No. 100)

100a) Documents "Barbarossa", directives by the Supreme Command, Armed Forces (File No. V, 5).
18 Dec - 1st Fuehrer directive for "Barbarossa".
It begins with the words "The German armed forces must be prepared to defeat Soviet Russia in a rapid campaign even before the end of the war against England. (Incident before the end of the war against England. (Incident "Barbarossa") ....." "The emphasis of the commitment of the Navy will remain directed unequivocally against England during an eastern campaign."

If decided upon I shall order the assembly for action against Soviet Russia 8 weeks before the contemplated beginning of the operation.

Preparation, which need a longer period, are - in case they have not as yet been done - to be started already now, and are to be concluded by 15 May 1941.

It is to be emphasized, however, that the intention of an attack are not noticeable....."

"The final goal of the operations is the shielding against Asiatic Russia on the general line Wolga/Archangelsk ....."

"In the course of these operations /Army operations/ the Russian baltic fleet will rapidly lose its bases, and thus will no longer be able to fight...."

"All.....orders, which are given, must be designed unequivocally in such a manner that they appear as precautionary measures just in case that Russia should change her attitude towards us."

Strongest secrecy is ordered "otherwise the danger exists that by a disclosure of our preparations, the execution of which is not yet determined as far as time is concerned - most serious political and military disadvantages will result....."

/s/ ADOLF HITLER

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101) A 16,234 20 Dec

Extensive evaluation of the situation by the Chief Naval Operations (OKM): Strengthening of the English position through unfavorable development of the situation in the eastern Mediterranean and because of the help from the USA demands absolute concentration against England, therefore serious doubts concerning "Barbarossa" before the defeat of England.

103) C VII/40,204 27 Dec

Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Naval Supreme Commander emphasizes again the strict concentration of our entire war effort against England as our main enemy is the most urgent need of the hour. On the one side England has gained strength by the unfortunate Italian conduct of the war in the Eastern Mediterranean and by the increasing American support. On the other hand, however, she can be hit mortally by a strangulation of her ocean traffic, which is already taking effect. What is being done for submarine and naval-air force construction, is much too little. Our entire war potential must work for the conduct of the war against England; thus for Navy and air force every fissure or strength prolongs the war and endangers the final success. Naval Supreme Commander voices serious objections against Russia campaign before the defeat of England. Fuehrer desires all possible advancement of submarine construction; present construction figures (12 to 15 per month) are too low. "Generally, however, the last continental enemy must be removed under all circumstances because of the present political development (Russia's leaving to mix in Balkan affairs), before he could come to grips with England. Thus the army must obtain the necessary strength. After that, full concentration on air force and navy can follow."

Thus, the Fuehrer's standpoint is contrary to that of the Naval Supreme Commander (Remark of B.)

103) A 16,302 26 Dec

Naval Supreme Commander reports in a situation conference as the Fuehrer's opinion. The political situation is changed by Russia's unreliability, as evident in the Balkan states; consequently rearmament of the army is necessary. Emphasis on navy and air force against England is not to be impaired.

1941

104) A 17,45 4 Jan

Roumanian government is convinced, that Russia plans the annexation of the entire Moldan area - hopes that Germany will prevent that by force of arms. Roumania's hope for the regaining of Bessarabia has not been set aside.

105) A 17,83 6 Jan

By way of Yugoslavia, it is reported that Russia attempts to influence Bulgarian foreign policy in reference to not joining the three power pact. (Compare BL.107). Generally lively, diplomatic activity by Russia in the Balkans.

(Translation note: Footnote on page 20 not legible in ink)

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106) C VII/41,6 8 Jan

Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Fuehrer declares; Russia's position in case of the imminent German action in Bulgaria not yet cleared. Russia needs Bulgaria for the assembly of troops against the Bosporus. Hope on USA, Russia keeps England together. Diplomatic preparation by England in Russia recognizable; England's aim is to set in motion Russian power against us. Stalin is to be regarded as an ice cold blackmailer. With USA and Russian entry into the war, very great burden for our conduct of the war. Therefore, every possibility of such a threat must be excluded from the very beginning. If the Russian threat can be removed, we can continue the fight against England under very tolerable conditions. Russia's collapse means considerable relief of burden for Japan, and increased danger for USA.

107) A 17,119 11 Jan

Signing of new, far-reaching agreements between Russia and Germany (Economical, resettlement and border questions).

108) A 17,149 12 Jan

Russian government denies foreign reports that she agrees with entry and stay of German troops in Bulgaria. Question was never mentioned by Germany to Russia. Denials given cause for concern in Bulgaria. (BL.20).

109) A 17,160 13 Jan

Russian press stresses strongly the German-Russian economic agreement, and emphasizes that the Anglo-Saxon powers would never succeed in disturbing the good relationship between the two powers.

110) A 17,214 17 Jan

Russian request for embarkation of naval commission on German heavy cruiser for training purposes for cruiser "L" was turned down by Chief, Naval Operations (SKL), because cruiser is in operational use. However, Naval Supreme Commander agrees to the participation of Russian officers in yard test voyages. (BL.361)

111) A 17,232 18 Jan

Fuehrer anticipates disturbance of the relations to Russia as the result of the Balkan operation. Fears for the Roumanian oil area.

112) A 17,255 20 Jan

Speech of Stalin: He works untiringly for the strengthening of the Russian fleet and army..... "The international situation is complicated and confused and even Russia is threatened by the danger of war."

113) A 17,287 22 Jan

Declaration in the House of Commons by Under Secretary of State Butler: England has repeatedly tried during the past year, to come to closer political cooperation with Russia. Russian government has not reacted on that.

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114) A 17,324 24 Jan

In the relationship Russia-Finland again more serious difficulties now. - Measures for the protection of the Roumanian oil areas.

115) A 17,327 24 Jan

Conference Fuehrer-Duce: Statements of the Fuehrer: great importance of Finland because of nickel resources; it shall not be touched any more. - Russian complaints because of German concentration in Roumania have been received but were rejected. Purpose of the German concentration: (a) Operations against Greece, (b) Protection of Bulgaria against Russia and Turkey, (c) Security measure and guarantee of Roumania.....USA even in case of entry into the war not a serious danger. Greater danger, despite favorable political and economic treaties, Russia. Therefore tying down of considerable forces on the Russian border. There is no danger as long as Stalin lives...

116) A 17,359 27 Jan

Russia warns Finland that going together with any State other than Russia is causing concern.

117) A 17,401 30 Jan

Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) reports to Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW) intentions for naval warfare against Russia in case of "Barbarossa".

118) C VII, 41,12 4 Feb

Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Naval Supreme Commander explains operational plans in a Russian incident, emphasizes especially the necessity for the seizure of Murmansk/Polarnoje, so that England cannot take a foothold there. (See also BL.47) Makes requests for support by the Air Force, and also cooperation with Finland, Roumania, Bulgaria, Sweden.

119) A 18,34 5 Feb

Requests of Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) for air support in case "Barbarossa" cannot be fulfilled completely because of lack of forces. Fuehrer points out as an especially important naval mission, rapid organization of the supply line to Leningrad.

120) A 18,32 11 Feb

According to a foreign press report, Russia is said to have told Bulgaria "she could not expect that Russia will have any further interest in her (Bulg) fate."

121) A 18,227 18 Feb FF

German reapproachment toward Russia's return of the seized Baltic ships. Measures for the protection of the west coast against English landings during "Barbarossa".
Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) insists on the occupation of Malta even before "Barbarossa". Measures for the covering up of the preparations for "Barbarossa". Concentration movements against Russia are to be put forth as the "greatest undertaking of deception of the history of war, which

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serves to distract from the last preparations of the invasion against England. Even in the armed forces the impression is to be kept up that the invasion is being prepared further. Liaison contact with Sweden, Finland, Hungary, Slovakia, Roumania is to be made as late as possible. (Time requirement of Chief Naval Operations (SKL) compare BL.340)

122) A 18,295 23 Feb

Instruction from Supreme Command, Armed Forces (OKW) that seizure of Malta is contemplated for the fall of 1941 after the execution of "Barbarossa" (compare BL.231).

123) A 18,319 24 Feb

Proclamation by Marshal Timoschenko: the entire Soviet nation, despite the successes of the neutrality policy must keep itself in constant readiness for the danger of an enemy surprise attack!

124) A 18,383 28 Feb F

Finnish General Staff still considers the Russian danger as very serious. Only Germany can beat Russia! -

125) C VIII/41,93 28 Feb

From the political orientation of the Atlantic forces by the Chief, Naval Operations (SKL): Russia needs for the execution of her reform plans, a period of peace of several years. Russia's foreign policy is thus marked by her will for neutrality, and avoidance of conflicts with strong opponent.

126) A 19,4 1 Mar

German march into Bulgaria.

127) A 19,39 3 Mar

Preparations of the Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) for Black Sea warfare in case of Russian intervention in the Balkan war.

128) A 19,53 FF 4 Mar
C VIII/41,97

Bulgaria's consent to the German entry is disapproved in Moscow; other reports also point to a stiffening of Russian attitude because of events in the Balkans; however, a basic change of the Russian attitude is not anticipated (compare to that also the German note to Russia of 22 June 41 IV). Bulgaria joins the Axis. Chief, Naval Operations (SKL) informs the General Staff of the Army that possibilities of support for the army by naval warfare in the Black Sea in case of "Barbarossa" are only limited.

129) A 19,71 5 Mar

General Staff of the Army is also shown, upon inquiry, the difficulties of supply in the Baltic in case of "Barbarossa". According to Fuehrer directive, the emphasis of the Navy remains against England even in case "Barbarossa".

130) A 17,85 6 Mar

Issue of directive #1 for case "Barbarossa" by Chief Naval Operations (SKL).

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131) A 19,209 15 Mar

According to report from diplomatic circles, improvement of relations between Russia and England.

132) A 19,224 16 Mar

Reports from agents: Russians prepare for mobilization on the Baltic coast.

133) A 19,233 17 Mar

Signs of Russian partial mobilization noticeable on the Western border.

134) C VII/41,53 18 Mar

Supreme Naval Commander with the Fuehrer: Supreme Naval Commander reports that according to a statement by Admiral Nomura, the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka has grave doubts because of the Russian problem - doubts relating to Japanese entry into the war - and he recommends that Matsuoka be informed about our own intentions in respect to Russia.

135) A 19,265 19 Mar

In case of "Barbarossa", Supreme Naval Commander describes the occupation of Murmansk as an absolute necessity for the Navy Chief of the Supreme Command Armed Forces, considers compliance very difficult; occupation of the Finnish northern area impossible according to report Dietl (BL.231, 20 Mar)

136) A 19,294 20 Mar

After long negotiation, Yugoslavia joins the three power pact, after restricting German concessions, German declaration of guarantee and promise of territorial gains (Exit to the Aegais) (Compare A 18,450)

137) A 19,307 22 Mar

USA press emphasizes cooling off of German-Russian relations, conviction that Russia will not let herself be drawn into war.

138) A 19,307 22 Mar

Russian-Turkish non-aggression pact in case of an attack by third power. According to C VIII/41,128, is considered as pointed at Germany.

139) A 19,344 25 Mar

Naval Attaché in Moscow points to the considerable strength of the Russian fleet built or under construction.

140) A 19,387 28 Mar FF

Overthrow of the Government and formation of an anti-German government in Yugoslavia (Compare BL. 375)
Russian request to make available German training personnel for cruiser "L". Chief Naval Operations (SKL) considers compliance feasible for military-political reasons.

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141) A 19,423 31 Mar

In the revolution in Yugoslavia American machinations are strongly involved (Russians not mentioned, compare, however, proclamation of Fuehrer dated 22 June 41, T.C. of 23 June - Remark by E.)

142) A 20,27 3 April FF

According to a Roumanian report, the impression exists that certain agreements between Russia and Yugoslavia - offer of war material ? - have influenced developments there. In Yugoslavia, rising of pan-Slavic movement. (Compare BL.13)

Balkan Operations /translators note: this is a foot note on page - 26 - I meant by that is probably the extension of operations to Yugoslavia (Remark by E.)/ delayed "Barbarossa" at first for about 5 weeks. All measures, which can be construed as offensive actions, are to be stopped according to Fuehrer order.

143) A 20,59 5 Apr

According to Roumanian diplomatic report, great anxiety in Russia about German attack, sympathy for Yugoslavia.

144) A 20,69 6 Apr C VIII/41,141

German entry into Greece, Yugoslavia. Few hours before hand conclusion of Russian-Yugoslavian pact of friendship, evaluated as clearly pointed against Germany, considered as not too important by Chief Naval Operations (OKM), since there is no common border. "Position of Russia" at the moment is one of quietness and waiting; apparently firmly decided for neutrality toward Germany (compare German note to Russia of 22 June 41, Figure V).

145) A 20,99 8 Apr

Fear of Germany still a decisive factor of Russian policy, change in neutrality only anticipated in case of serious weakening of Germany; but increasing coolness unmistakable. (Compare BL.113, 9 April)

146) A 20,125 10 Apr

Russian war council, under Timoshenko: state of emergency and increased military preparations for all units on the Western front.

147) A 20,151 12 Apr

Russian attitude still not clear toward Balkan development, which is being regarded with dissatisfaction. - Economically cooperative as before. Signing of a new oil delivery treaty.

148) A 20,173 13 Apr

Conclusion neutrality pact Russia/Japan.

149) A 20,219 10 Apr

German Balkan successes lead to the "return of Russia to the previous correct attitude". Conclusion of Russian-Japanese

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pact "shows failure of the Anglo-American attempt to activate Russia against the three powers of the pact". English attempts, however, are being continued (BL.252). Russian attitude toward Germany further improved, however, military preparations on the Russian border proceed.

150) C VII/41,70 20 Apr

Naval Supreme Commander with Fuehrer: Naval Supreme Commander asks about result of Matsuoka's visit, and evaluation of Japanese-Russian pact (14 April). Fuehrer has informed Matsuoka, "that Russia will not be touched if she behaves friendly according to the treaty. Otherwise, he reserves action for himself." Japan-Russia pact has been concluded in agreement with Germany, and is to prevent Japan from advancing against Vladivostok, and to cause her to attack Singapore. Above standpoint of the Fuehrer has affected Russia's position favorably, who is now behaving very correctly and does not expect an attack.

Naval Supreme Commander asks "what opinion the Fuehrer has about the presently recognizable new Russian change of mind in a decisive pro-German sense".
Fuehrer replies as above.

151) A 20,295 21 Apr

Relief of tension Russia-Finland (by Russia's giving in BL.315). Russia at present eager to avoid every incident.

152) A 20,341 24 Apr

Naval Attaché in Moscow reports considerable extent of rumors: danger of war Germany-Russia, fed by transient travellers from Germany. English Ambassador predicts as day of outbreak of war 22 June! -

153) A 20,354 25 Apr

According to the declarations in the English House of Commons, no great progress in the improvement of Anglo-Russian relations; English efforts will be continued.

154) A 20,413 29 Apr

Moscow radio reports landing of four German transports with 12,000 men in Finland.

155) A 21,1 1 May

Proclamations by Stalin and Timoshenko on account of first of May, show that Russia is striving with all means at her disposal to keep out of the war, and on account of the fluid international to prepare for any eventualities. Further urgent war preparations and measures for the protection of the Russian western border (BL.3).

156) A 21,13 2 May

According to English press, Anglo-Russian negotiations for the conclusion of a political treaty have failed.

157) A 21,30 3 May

According to a report of the Naval Attaché in Moscow, no conspicuous or more extensive military preparations visible. (Compare, however, report by Ambassador BL.141).

158) A 21,51 5 May

English radio speaks of stronger indication of German attack on Russia.

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159) A 21,66 6 May

Appointment of Stalin as chairman of the council of people's commissioners; according to the Chief Naval Operations (Skl) this means: concentration of the entire executive power, strengthening of the government authority and "desire to continue the present foreign policy, avoidance of conflict with Germany."

160) A 21,28 7 May

The appointment of Stalin is evaluated in neutral countries - even in the USA - as an indication of closer cooperation with Germany and of an all-inclusive agreements between Germany and Russia.

161) A 21,125 10 May

Moscow withdraws diplomatic recognition from the Norwegian, Belgians, Yugoslavian representations (apparently a friendly gesture toward Germany) - compare BL.156. In the opinion of the Naval Attache Stalin "the bearer of German-Soviet cooperation".

161a) A 21,235 17 May

Evaluation of Russian policy in Turkish diplomatic circles: Russia wants to satisfy Germany by the last Russian declaration, by the expulsion of the diplomats of territories, occupied by the Germans, and above all, by extensive deliveries, and also to remove all doubts on the political scene. One can count on a new German-Russian understanding, for the purpose of which Stalin took over the office of prime-minister! - (Report from the Embassy)

162) C VII/41,160 22 May

Supreme Naval Commander with the Fuehrer: Supreme Naval Commander declares all preparations for the holding back of the war materials consigned to Russia have been made. In the near future it will be explained to the Russian navy that, because of our own need, there may be small delays in the deliveries, without endangering the whole. Fuehrer agrees..

163) A 21,439 29 May

Begin of the preparatory warship movements for "Barbarossa".

164) A 21,454 30 May

demands urgently decisive offensive Egypt-Suez for fall 1941; 12 division is needed for that; "This stroke would be more deadly to the British Empire than the capture of London"! Chief Naval Operations (Skl) agrees completely, and expresses himself in the same manner as stated below under No. 168.

165) A 22,29 4 June

Outwardly, no change in the relationship Germany-Russia. Russian deliveries continue to full satisfaction. Russian government is endeavoring to do everything to prevent a conflict with Germany.

166) A 22,31 4 June

On suggestion of the commander of the submarines (B.d.V). Most economic use of submarines in the Baltic in case "Barbarossa"; bright nights; no unnecessary use for operations where Navy is not deciding; instead full use against England.

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167) A 22,53 6 June

Ambassador in Moscow reports..... Russia will only fight if attacked by Germany. Situation is considered in Moscow much more serious than up to now. All military preparations have been made quietly - as far as can be recognized only defensive. Russian policy still strives as before to produce the best possible relationship to Germany as good.

168) C VII/41,173 6 June

Naval Supreme Commander with the Fuehrer: Memorandum of the Chief, Naval Operations (Skl) Observation on the strategic situation in the Eastern Mediterranean after the Balkan campaign and the occupation of Crete and further conduct of the war: This memorandum was presented to the Fuehrer by Naval Supreme Commander according to BL.124 in heavily condensed form and was submitted apparently mainly for the purpose of increased Italian conduct of the war in the Mediterranean; it represents one of the most important documents of the war records. It is yet to be determined whether and to which offices in the Fuehrer's headquarters, it was submitted. The memorandum points with impressive clarity to the decisive aims of the war in the near east. Their advancement has moved into grasping distance by the successes in the Aegean area, and the memorandum emphasizes that the offensive utilization of the present favorable situation must take place with the greatest acceleration and energy, before England has again strengthened her position in the near east with help from the USA. The memorandum realizes the unalterable fact that the campaign against Russia would be opened very shortly, demands, however, that the undertaking "Barbarossa" "which because of the magnitude of its aims, naturally stands in the foreground of the operational plans of the armed forces leadership, must under no circumstances bear to an abandonment, diminishing a delay of the conduct of the war in the Eastern Mediterranean." (BL.126). It states furthermore that, despite the strain on the German armed forces by the operation "Barbarossa", the complete operational exploitation of the great successes achieved lately "must be carried out at a time when the help of the USA for England has not as yet attained a decisive extent. (BL.179). In a note of the Chief First Naval District (1/Skl) of 18 Aug. 43, it says in this connection: "At that time, it was also the conviction of the Chief Naval Operations (Skl), that the war against Russia was inevitable, after Stalin had proved himself as a blackmailer by his behaviour (Baltic States, Bessarabia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria). (Pencilled marginal note: Thus the Chief Naval Operations (Skl) did not know the real extortions?) About on 15 June the Fuehrer, in a dinner speech of 1½ hours, explained in the presence of all the higher commanders of the armed forces, in all inclusive, convincing explanation, that the eastern campaign was inevitable, and that we therefore must conduct it in a preventative and offensive manner to avoid that the Russians could overrun us at a later time after longer appropriate preparations, when we are tied down in other sectors." Certainly, the opinion which the Chief, Naval Operations (Skl) then had has been decisively influenced by the generally spread confidence that the campaign against Russia could be completed victoriously in a few months. - (Remark by B.)

169) A 22,65 7 June

From the report of the Ambassador in Moscow..... All observations show, that Stalin and Molotov, who alone are responsible for Russian foreign policy, are doing everything to avoid a conflict with Germany. The entire behaviour of the government as well as the attitude of the press, which reports all events concerning Germany in a factual, indisputable manner, support this view. The loyal fulfillment of the economic treaty with Germany, shows the same thing.

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170) A 22,121 12 June

London expects a fundamental change of German-Russian relations and seen a German explanation on the development of German-Russian relations.

171) A 22,123 12 June

Directive of Chief, Naval Operations (Skl) to prevent German commercial ships, destined for Russian ports, from leaving by a fictious reason.

172) A 22,138 13 June

According to Finnish reports, for the first time Russian patrol activity at the Western exit of the Gulf of Finland.

173) C VIII/41,247 14 June

Official declaration by the Russian Tass-agency, which turns against rumors of the coming German-Russian war; emphasizes conscientious fulfillment of the pact by both parties -- The declaration is evaluated by the German side, as an attempt to make Germany as the aggressor in case of a possible attack. (Compare A 22,149)

174) A 22,151 14 June

Speech by the Fuehrer before the highest armed forces of the commands about the background and intended execution of "Barbarossa" (compare No. 168, memorandum by the Chief, First Naval District (1/Skl)

175) A 22,154 14 June

Further Russian security measures in the Gulf of Finland. (Compare BL.205, 235)

176) A 22,161 15 June

Enemy and neutral press discuss tension in the German-Russian relationship. Some consider immediate impending German advance as inevitable. Compare BL.172: Stalin prepared to extreme concessions; leading army circles against further policy of compliance.

177) A 22,165 15 June

On the proposal of Chief Naval Operations (Skl) (Compare BL.218,236) use of arms against Russian submarines, south of the northern boundary of the Poland warning area is permitted immediately; ruthless destruction is to be aimed at.

178) A 22,179 16 June

Permission of veiled aerial observation of the operational area for "Barbarossa" by Chief, Naval Operations (Skl); violations of neutrality are to be avoided under all circumstances.

179) A 22,188 17 June

Directive of Chief, Naval Operations (Skl), that naval war measures in the case of "Barbarossa" are to be directed in such a way that the main emphasis of the use lies still in the warfare against England. Aim of the Baltic naval warfare to paralyze the enemy by our own initiative to avoid large own losses, and to increase our own freedom of movement. The lifespan of the Russian fleet depends after all on the progress of land operations.

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180) A 22,195 17 June

Supreme Command, Armed Forces (OKW) confirms "D" day 22 June.

181) A 22,203 18 June

On proposal of Chief Naval Operations (Skl), directive of the Air force, Supreme Commander, that Russian ships and port installations are to be spared during aerial attacks.

182) A 22,243 20 June

The Admiral South-East receives directive from the Chief Naval Operations (Skl) that the Black Sea missions are absolutely defensive, since Roumania, at first, is not to be considered as being in a state of war.

183) A 22,258 21 June

Reconnaissance of the Baltic theater of operations shows Russian readiness, laying of mine barriers, but no striking movements, no symptoms that Russians are set for imminent German operations. Apparently, battle ships still continue target practice! -

184) The contemplated German offensive mine barriers were laid according to plan, apparently unnoticed, the German submarines are in alert positions and assembling, also the S-flotillas. All shipping will be stopped from 2000 hours on.

185) A 22,267 22 June

Begin of hostilities against Russia.
Our own operations were not disturbed by the enemy, although they are taking place in his immediate vicinity. The outbreak of hostilities has stimulated movements and activity of Russian Naval forces only moderately. Symptom of energetic offensive reaction against the German attack cannot be recognized on the evening of the first day on the enemy's side.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-170

18 November 1945

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, 2nd Lt., Inf. O-1332102, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated excerpt of Document No. C-170.

GERARD SCHAEFER
2nd Lt. Inf.
O-1332102

Read 15.1.46
GB 228

TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS OF DOCUMENT C-176
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Extracts from War Diary Admiral Bachmann, F.O.I.C., Western France

10.12.42

About 1015. Telephone call from personal representative of the Officer-in-charge of the Security Service in Paris, SS-Obersturmfuehrer Dr. Schmidt to F.O.I.C.'s Flag Lieutenant, requesting postponement of the shooting, as interrogation had not been concluded. Interrogations up to date have produced important information concerning organization and training of the Commandos.

After consultation with the Chief of Operations Staff the Security Service had been directed to get approval direct from Headquarters.

1820. Security Service, Bordeaux, requested Security Service authorities at Fuehrer's headquarters to postpone the shooting for 3 days. Interrogations continued for the time being.

11.12.42

0030. Shooting of the two prisoners was carried out by a unit (strength 1/16) belonging to N.O.I.C. Bordeaux, in the presence of an officer of the Security Service, Bordeaux, on order of the Fuehrer.

(Note in green pencil in margin opposite above entry: "Security Service should have done this. Phone F.O.I.C. in future cases.")

The operation was particularly favored by the weather conditions and the dark night.

(signed) BACHMANN

The following two signals refer to the shooting of prisoners:

1). C-in-C Navy Group West. Paris, 22.12.42.
To: F.O.I.C., Western France.

Subject: Act of sabotage in Bordeaux harbor.

Ref. Gkdos 6447 of 15.12.42.

According to a previous signal, the shooting of the two saboteurs by a detachment from N.O.I.C., Bordeaux, was carried out at 0030 on 11.12.42.

As the execution of saboteurs is a matter for the Security Service, it is ordered that in future cases delinquents are to be handed over to the Security Service to be shot.

2). F.O.I.C., Western France 31.12.42.
No. 6743 AIa.

To: Sea Defense Commandant, Gascogne.
N.O.I.C., Bordeaux

In future cases, it is ordered that saboteurs are to be handed over to theSecurity Service to be shot, as the execution of saboteurs is a matter for the Security Service.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF EXTRACTS OF DOCUMENT
No. C-176

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7 December 1945

I, EVELYN GLAZIER, P/O, W.R.N.S., 37371, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Extracts of Document C-176.

EVELYN GLAZIER
P/O, W.R.N.S.
37371

Read 15.1.46

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-179
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

SEC24-10/C-179

Naval War Staff
Ref. No.1 SKL I Op. 26367/42 Most Secret

BERLIN, 28 October 1942

To:- See Distribution:

Enclosed please find a Führer Order regarding anninilation of terror and sabotage units.

This order must not be distributed in writing by Flotilla leaders, Section Commanders or officers of this rank.

After verbal distribution to subordinate sections the above authorities must hand this order over to the next highest section which is responsible for its confiscation and destruction.

PP:

In Draft signed:

WAGNER

Checked:

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TOP SECRET

The Fuehrer
No. 003830/42 g. Kdos. OKW/WFSt. Fuehrer HQ, 18 Oct. 1942

12 Copies

1.) For some time our enemies have been using in their warfare methods which are outside the international Geneva Conventions. Especially brutal and treacherous is the behavior of the so-called commandos, who, as is established, are partially recruited even from freed criminals in enemy countries. From captured orders it is divulged, that they are directed not only to shackle prisoners, but also to kill defenseless prisoners on the spot at the moment in which they believe that the latter as prisoners represent a burden in the further pursuit of their purposes or could otherwise be a hindrance. Finally, orders have been found in which the killing of prisoners has been demanded in principle.

2.) For this reason it was already announced in an addendum to the Armed Forces report of 7 October 1942, that in the future, Germany, in the fact of these sabotage troops of the British and their accomplices, will resort to the same procedure, i.e., that they will be ruthlessly mowed down by the German troops in combat, wherever they may appear.

3.) I therefore order:

From now on all enemies on so-called Commando missions in Europe or Africa challenged by German troops, even if they are to all appearances soldiers in uniform or demolition troops, whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be slaughtered to the last man. It does not make any difference whether they are landed from ships and aeroplanes for their actions, or whether they are dropped by parachute. Even if these individuals, when found, should apparently be prepared to give themselves up, no pardon is to be granted them on principle. In each individual case full information is to be sent to the O.K.W. for publication in the Report of the Military Forces.

4.) If individual members of such commandos, such as agents, saboteurs, etc. fall into the hands of the military forces by some other means, through the police in occupied territories for instance, they are to be handed over immediately to the SD. Any imprisonment under military guard, in PW Stockades for instance, etc., is strictly prohibited, even if this is only intended for a short time.

5.) This order does not apply to the treatment of any enemy soldiers who, in the course of normal hostilities (large-scale offensive actions, landing operations and airborne operations), are captured - in open battle or give themselves up. Nor does this order apply to enemy soldiers falling into our hands after battles at sea, or enemy soldiers trying to save their lives by parachute after battles.

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6.) I will hold responsible under Military Law, for failing to carry out this order, all commanders and officers who either have neglected their duty of instructing the troops about this order, or acted against this order where it was to be executed.

Signed: Adolf Hitler.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO.C-179

I, Mark S. Schafer, Pvt. 42090012, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C-179.

Mark S. Schafer,
Pvt. 42090012.

H1165 - 0070

H1165 - 0071

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-189
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel.

SEC 24-10/C-189

Conversation with the Führer in June 1934 on the occasion of the resignation of the Commanding Officer of the "KARLSRUHE".

1) Report by the C-in-C Navy concerning increased displacement of D. and E.(defensive weapons)

Führer's instructions: No mention must be made of a displacement of 25-26,000 tons, but only of improved 10,000 ton(ships). Also, the speed over 26 nautical miles may be stated.

2) C in C Navy expresses the opinion that later on the fleet must anyhow be developed to oppose England, that therefore from 1936 onwards, the large ships must be armed with 35 c.m. guns(like the King George Class).

3) The Führer demands to keep the construction of the U-Boats completely secret, Plebisite also in consideration of the Saar.

Translator's note:
This document is in Raeder's writing but is not signed.

- -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-189

14 Nov. 1945.

I, WALTER R. SELIGSON, 1st Lt. 0-155 89 04, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. C-189.

Walter R. Seligson
1st Lt. 0-155 89 04

H1165 - 0072

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-190
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Conversation with the Fuehrer on 2.11.34 at the time of the announcement by the Commanding Officer of the "EMDEN".

1) When I mentioned that the total funds to be made available for the Armed Forces for 1935 would presumably represent only a fraction of the required sum, and that therefore it was possible that the Navy might be hindered in its plans, he replied that he did not think the funds would be greatly decreased. He considered it necessary that the Navy be speedily increased by 1938 with the deadlines mentioned. In case of need, he will get Dr. Ley to put 120 - 150 million from the Labour Front at the disposal of the Navy, as the money would still benefit the workers. Later in a conversation with Minister Goering and myself, he went on to say that he considered it vital that the Navy be increased as planned, as no war could be carried on if the Navy was not able to safeguard the oreimports from Scandinavia.

2) Then, when I mentioned that it would be desirable to have 6 U-boats assembled at the time of the critical political situation in the first quarter of 1935, he stated that he would keep this point in mind and tell me when the situation demanded that the assembling should commence.*

* The order was not sent out. The first boats were launched in the middle of June 35 according to plan.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO C-190

15 November 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document C-190.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT EC 177
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

TOP SECRET

The Reichswehr Minister

Berlin, 22 May 1933

T.A. Nr. 421/33 g. Kdos. T 2 III A:

40 Copies
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P R O T O C O L

Of the 2nd Session of the Working Committee of the Delegates for Reich Defense.

Time: 26 April 1933

Start: 1000 hours
End : 1230 hours

Place: Large Conference Room in Reichswehr Ministry

Participants:

Reichswehr Ministry:	
Dept. of the Field Army (Truppenamt):	Chief Lt. Gen Adam
T 2	Chief Col. Keitel
	Capt. Schmundt
	Capt. Bruetor
T 2 Administration	Min. Rat. Dr. Weber
T 1 IV	Major Gercke (ret)
Dept. of Air Raid Protection:	Capt. Speidel
Dept. of the Reg. Trng. and Repl. Army (Wehrmacht):	
Chief of Staff	Lt. Col. Winzer
In 6 " " "	Lt. Col. Guderian
In 7 " " "	Lt. Col. Fellgiebel
Ordnance Dept. (Waffenamt):	Lt. Col. Stud
Wa Wi.	Major Barlimont
Administrative Dept.: (V3)	Min Rat. Reich
Ministry Office:	
"	Col. von Viotinghoff
	Capt. Tschache
Security	Capt. Wahle
Delegates for Reich Defense from the Reich Ministries:	
Foreign Office:	Legation Secretary von Buelow
Interior:	Ob. Reg. Rat. Erbe
Finance:	Gen. Finanzrat Papenhensch
Economics:	Min. Rat. Godlewski
	Reg. Rat Dr. Barth
Labor:	Min. Rat Sieler
Postal:	Min. Rat Delvendahl
Traffic:	Min. Rat Koffka
Justice:	Min. Rat Koffka
Food and Agriculture:	Amtsgerichtsrat Bretschneidner
Air:	Capt. Bolle (ret)
Prussian Ministry of the Interior:	Ob. Reg. Rat Diels

Minutes:

Lt. Gen. Adam: Welcoming of the delegates especially of the respresentative of the Air Ministry present for the first time.

H1165 – 0073

Information about the decision of the Reich Cabinet of the 4 April 1933 to form a "Reich Defense Council".

Reference to:

a. Change of the responsibility for the defense of the Reich.

b. The decision to make the activities of the delegates a full-time job, and the necessity for this measure order to master the important and extensive tasks.

With a wish for trustful cooperation in the working committee of the RVR (Reich Defense Council) transfer of the presidency to Col. Keitel (Chief T 2).

Col. Keitel: After welcoming takes up business of the day.

Item 1

Thoughts about a Reich Defense Council

All great European powers which are at freedom to arm, have a RVR. One does not have to refer to history to prove the necessity of this institution. The war has shown conclusively that the cooperation with the various ministries has not been close enough. The consequences did not fail to materialize. The soldier is not in a position to have a say in all matters. The disadvantages of the past system were caused by parallel efforts of the various ministries in matters of the Reich defense. To avoid these mistakes a central agency has been created which occupies itself already in peacetime in the widest sense with the problems of Reich Defense. This working staff will continue its existence in time of war.

In accordance with the cabinet decision of the 4 April 1933 the Reich Defense Council, which until now had been prepared for war emergency, will go into immediate action.

In time of peace its task will be to decide about all measures for the preparation of the defense of the Reich, while surveying and utilizing all powers and means of the nation. To this effect a law placing every German and his personal property at the war service of the nation (Kriegsleistungsgesetz) is being prepared which will be submitted to the committee after its completion.

Composition of the Reich Defense Council:

President: Reichs Chancellor Deputy: Reichswehr Minister

Permanent Members: Minister of the:

Reichswehr
Foreign Affairs
Interior
Finance
Economic Affairs
Public Enlightenment and Propaganda
Air
Chief of [illegible] Naval Staff
Chief of [illegible] Army Command Staff

Depending on the case: The responsible minister, other personalities, e.g., leading industrialists, etc.

In order to regulate the work it is necessary to determine who will do the drafting of the various tasks and in what manner. The Reich ministries will receive instructions in this regard from the Reichswehr Minister

Item 2

Full-time Employment of the Delegates:

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Whether the full-time employment of delegates for the Reich Defense Council necessitates changes of personnel within the permanent committee will have to be decided by the ministries concerned. It is requested to settle this matter with the various ministries and to inform the Reichswehrminister which full-time delegate is slated for the working committee.

Ob. Reg. Rat Erbe (Interior): The solution of this question is rendered more difficult by the fact that each of the delegates has already a large field of work, to which he is deeply attached and which he will part with unwillingly.

Ob. Reg. Rat Diels (Prussian Ministry of the Interior): Is of the same opinion. He himself is in addition, in charge of the Secret State Police. Remedy: Full time assistants.

Min Rat Gedlewski (Economics): Recommends the solution of the Reich Ministry of Economics: The delegate keeps his own field of work with addition of the Reich Defense tasks, which are handled by a special official (at present Rat Dr. Barth) exclusively and as a full time job. This way a higher official retains the direction, without being overburdened with the work.

Lt. Gen. Adam: Agrees with the opinion of Min. Rat Gedlewski and proposes a similar solution for the other Reich Ministries.

Amtsgerichtsrat Protschneider (Food and Agriculture): Does not believe that the Ministry of Food and Agriculture will be able to send a special delegate in view of the general overload with work.

Col. Keitel: The amount of work of the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture will not decrease. Food supply, however, is of the utmost importance in case of mobilization, so that an intensive cooperation on the part of this ministry is absolutely essential.

Min. Rat Schmidt (Traffic): At the Traffic Ministry hardly any higher officials can be made available for this full time task. A good deal of the work in the realm of the Reich Defense could be done by the R.V.K.

Lt. Gen. Adam: The tasks will be distributed and it is a matter of the various ministries to take care of same. Best solution: Higher official with full time assistants.

Col Keitel: Points out once more the urgency of the tasks, since it had been possible to do only very little in this connection during the last years. He asks the delegates to consider the Reich Defense at all times and represent it accordingly at the drafting of new laws. Experiences of the wars are available and are at the disposal of the various ministries: (e.g. Reich Archives, Memorandum of an administrative official about gasoline supply). All these sources must be taken advantage of for the future. The task of the full time delegates is also to bring about a close cooperation of the ministries with each other.

Min Rat Schmidt (Traffic): Requests a complete roster of the committee members.

Col. Keitel: Agrees to that, as soon as the ministries have named their full-time delegates.

Item 3

Nature of Work Plans

In the work plans the questions and ideas are laid down, which have come up in the Reichswehr Ministry and must be considered in case of mobilization. Up to the present time the support on the part of other ministries was frequently based only on personal helpfulness since any authority from above was lacking. The following work plans are finished:

a. Work Plan for the Reichs Ministry of Economics
" " " " " " " Food and Agriculture
" " " " " " " Labor

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These three are composed in one work plan for the preparation of a war economy.

b. Work Plan for the Reich Postal Ministry

c. Work Plan for the Reich Traffic Ministry.

Request the plans to be worked through carefully by the competent ministries. The plans will be discussed beginning of June, when proposals for improvements may be made. The other ministries which have no work plans yet will receive them later on. The office of air raid protection will work out a work plan in conjunction with the Reich Commissariat for aviation.

Min. Rat Godlewski (Ministry of Economics):

1. In case a completed plan for mobilization is to be created a preparation of requisition orders for the supply of raw materials, creating of war industries and getting in touch with personalities to be charged with these tasks in case of war, is necessary . All this means years of work.

2. What about the financial aspects of this work? Naturally, large sums will be required for it, with which the ministry concerned will be debited. To what extent can this be carried out in practice and to what extent will it remain only paper work once more?

Col. Keitel: Certainly, the working out of these plans requires a long time. The Reichswehr Ministry has worked for years on the principles of Reich Defense, too. The organization of a war economy always requires plenty of money and time. It is just the reason for and the purpose of the working committee of the Reich Defense Council to overcome these difficulties. Proposals and inquiries of the various Reich ministries must be made the subjects of sessions of the Reich Defense Council (Cabinet) by the working committee. It is to be decided there, which tasks have priorities over others and for which purposes means have to be available. Nevertheless, the financing of the various proposals remains a matter of the ministry concerned. The direct influence of the Reich Chancellor on these tasks represents, however, a great progress compared with past times. The various ministries have to submit yearly budget proposals, which are to be approved separately.

Min. Rat Delvendahl (Postal Ministry): Sees an acceleration of the tasks in a direct cooperation with the Wehrmacht experts. Which is the competent agency for that in the Reichswehr Ministry?

Col. Keitel: The Army Organization Department is competent only for the great guiding principles. Technical matters are to be settled with the special offices of the Reichswehr Ministry. Inquiries regarding the specialists are to be addressed to the secretary of the Reich Defense Council, Capt. Schmandt.

Min. Rat Delvendahl (Postal Ministry): Who is competent in questions of general nature?

Col. Keitel: Can be decided only from case to case.

Item 4

Security and Secrecy

Question has been brought up by the Reich Ministries.

The secrecy of all Reich defense work has to be maintained very carefully. Communications with the outside by messenger service only, has been settled already with the Post Office, Finance Ministry, Prussian Ministry of the Interior and the Reichswehr Ministry. Main Principle of security: No document must be lost since, otherwise, the enemy propaganda would make use of it, Matters communicated orally cannot be proven, they can be denied by us in Geneva. Therefore, the Reichswehrministry has worked out security directives for the Reich Ministries and the Prussian Ministry of the Interior.

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Reading of the Security directives (Rn. M.T.A. Nr. 285/33 g.K. T 2 III A dated 19 April 33), by Capt Schmundt.

Col. Keitel: Under no circumstances communications by mail.

Min. Rat. Delvendahl (Postal Ministry): Secret but urgent letters can be mailed in locked leather cases wrapped in special envelope. Heasks for a moderation of the dispatching directives.

Col. Keitel: The main thing is that the mail in the various ministries is opened by the addressee himself and not by the main office or another agency. It is of utmost importance that ways and means are provided to guarantee an absolutely safe transportation.

Min. Rat Rat Koffka (Ministry of Justice): It is most dangerous to mark the outside of the letters "Secret". Incidentally, up to the present time there is no real protection furnished in the Ministry of Justice. Only one steel safe is available.

Col. Keitel: The need for steel safes grows only slowly. The Reichswehr Ministry has spent a lot of money to obtain a sufficient number of steel safes for itself and the branch offices. Steel safes remain, nevertheless, an urgent requirement. Letters are to be addressed to the recipient personally.

Gen Finanzrat Kapenhensch (Finance Ministry): If letters pertaining to Reich Defense can be written in such a way that in case of loss their contents cannot be recognized as mobilisation measures by enemy news services, express matters must be dispatched by mail

Col. Keitel: The purpose of the directive is not to represent clear unequivocal instructions for all cases, but to point out inherent dangers in case of leakage. Have to be decided separately in every case. Proposals about this matter in June. The purpose, not the form decides.

Item 5

Leaves of absence resp. releases from duty for the purpose of participation in training measures outside the Wehrmacht.

Notices pertaining to this subject have been sent to Ministries already. Reich Cabinet has decided to grant leaves of absence to officials in the services of the Reich, etc., without deducting that time from their recreational leaves. The Reich authorities in the Reich will be informed by the Wehrkreigkommandos. I request the Pussian Ministry of the Interior to state whether this measure is to be in effect in it sphere, as well.

Ob. Reg. Rat Diels (Pr. Min. of the Int.): Agrees for Prussia.

Min. Rat Schmidt (Traffic): For the RR officilas etc. this will be settled by the R.V.K. The authorities will be informed orally, but how is one to go about the instruction of the laborers. 27,000 workmen at the administration of waterways construction alone? Does that not invite abuses? What about secrecy in that case?

Col. Keitel: Only the authorities are to be informed. The men will be advised by the Wehrmacht agencies themselves. The men volunteer since they are mostly in reserve units. During the training

a. Security
b. Regulation of leaves of absence.

will be explained. Unfortunately, the announcement of a leave will schedule is not possible. The Ministries need not worry about the orientation of the men. What matters is that the superiors authorized to grant leaves are informed accordingly in advance.

Item 6

Storage of Weapons

H1165 - 0077

a. Renting of state owned lands (e.g. State Forestry areas) must be accomplished without cost.

b. The Finance Ministry has set up a "re-enforced border control service". The value of this organization lies in the distribution of personnel among the customs sectors - equal to border protection sectors. Exchange of personnel rosters between the customs etc., uthorities and the Wehrkreise is in effect already. The peace-time maneuvers of the re-enforced border control service are of great importance.

c. Storage of weapons near the location where they will be needed. Unfortunately weapon stores are not always secret any more (Czech newspaper). Secrecy must be maintained to a much greater extent, appeal to, the assembled gentlemen.

d. Request to the postal authorities: Protection of Reich mail service to be prepared for the event of mobilization (at present available only in case of domestic disorders). The border protection maneuvers in Breslau have disclosed many deficiencies in communications in case of a Polish invasion of Upper Silesia. Police is not to be made available for such purposes. What has been the mission of the Landsturm in days past will have to be carried out by organizations created by the Reich Ministries themselves.

e. Consideration of the interests of Reich Defense when drafting new laws. (Examples: Construction Industry, electrification of railways). Cooperation by the Ministries is requested. Considerations of thrift alone must not be the determining factor. The interests of Reich Defense must not be forgotten for one moment.

Min. Rat Dalvendahl (Postal Ministry): Asks for the text of the cabinet resolution with regard to the Reich Defense Council.

Capt. Tschache (Ministry Office): Reads it.

Col. Keitel: Promises each of the Ministries a copy of the decree of the cabinet resolution. A discussion of the work plans in separate sessions is planned for the beginning of June.

Ob. Reg. Diels (Prussian Min. of Int.): Asks the council to deal directly with the Gestapo Department with regard to Reich Defense problems, since furnishes the best guarantee for the secrecy of the problems and tasks and because that office is anyway the competent agency in the Pr. Min. of the Int. to deal with the district registration offices, Control agencies, border protection, etc.

sgd. Keitel

Distribution:
See list of participants in the
first part of the document.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. EC 177

13 December 1945

I, EDGAR BODENHEIMER, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. EC 177.

EDGAR BODENHEIMER

H1165 – 0078

H1165 – 0079

TOP SECRET (Transl. Geheime Reichsache) L. 79
To be transmitted by officer only.

Minutes
of a conference on 23 May 39

Place: The Fuhrer's Study, New Reich Chancellery.

Adjudant on duty: Lt.-Col. (G.S.) Schmundt.

Present: The Fuhrer, Field-Marshal Goring, Grand-Admiral Raeder.

Col-Gen. von Brauchitsch, Col-Gen. Keitel, Col-Gen. Milch, Gen. (of Artillery) Halder, Gen. Bodenschatz, Rear-Admi. Schniewindt, Col. (G.S.) Jeschonnek, Col. (G.S.) Warlimont, Lt-Col. (G.S.) Schmundt, Capt. Engel (Army), Lieut-Comd. Albrecht, Capt. v. Below (Army).

Subject: Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims.

(Page 2)

The Fuhrer defined as the purpose of the conference:

1) Analysis of the situation.
2) Definition of the tasks for the Armed Forces arising from that situation.
3) Exposition of the consequences of those tasks.
4) Ensuring the secrecy of all decisions and work resulting from these consequences.

Secrecy is the first essential for success.

The Fuhrer's observations are given in systematised form below.

Our present situation must be considered from two points of view:

1) The actual development of events between 1933 and 1939;
2) The permanent and unchanging situation in which Germany lies.

In the period 1933-1939, progress was made in all fields. Our military situation improved enormously.

Our situation with regard to the rest of the world has remained the same.

Germany had dropped from the circle of Great Powers. The balance of power had been effected without the participation of Germany.

This equilibrium is disturbed when Germany's demands for the necessities of life make themselves felt, and Germany re-emerges as a Great Power. All demands are regarded as "Encroachments". The English are more afraid of dangers in the economic sphere than of the simple threat of force. (p. 3)

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A mass of 80 million people has solved the ideological problems. So, too, must the economic problems be solved. No German can evade the creation of the necessary economic conditions for this. The solution of the problems demands courage. The principle, by which one evades solving the problem by adapting oneself to circumstances, is inadmissable. Circumstances must rather be adapted to aims. This is impossible without invasion of foreign states or attacks upon foreign property.

Living space, in proportion to the magnitude of the state, is the basis of all power. One may refuse for a time to face the problem, but finally it is solved one way or the other. The choice is between advancement or decline. In 15 or 20 years' time we shall be compelled to find a solution. No German statesman can evade the question longer than that.

We are at present in a state of patriotic fervour, which is shared by two other nations: Italy and Japan.

The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in harmony with our aims.

After 6 years, the situation is today as follows: (p. 4)

The national-political unity of the Germans has been achieved, apart from minor exceptions. Further successes cannot be attained without the shedding of blood.

The demarkation of frontiers is of military importance.

The Pole is no "supplementary enemy". Poland will always be on the side of our adversaries. In spite of the treaties of friendship, Poland has always had the secret intention of exploiting every opportunity to do us harm.

Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a question of expanding our living space on the East and of securing our food supplies, of the settlement of the Baltic problem. Food supplies can be expected only from thinly populated areas. Over and above the natural fertility, thoroughgoing German exploitation will enormously increase the surplus.

There is no other possibility for Europe.

Colonies: Beware of gifts of colonial territory. This does not solve the food problem. Remember - blockade.

If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. We shall be able to rely upon record harvests, even less in time of war than in peace.

The population of non-German areas will perform no military service, and will be available as a source of labour. (p. 5)

The Polish problem is inseparable from conflict with the West.

Poland's internal power of resistance to Bolshevism is doubtful. Thus Poland is of doubtful value as a barrier against Russia.

It is questionable whether military success in the West can be achieved by a quick decision, questionable too is the attitude of Poland.

The Polish government will not resist pressure from Russia. Poland sees danger in a German victory in the West, and will attempt to rob us of the victory.

There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with

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The decision:

To attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity

We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will bewar. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of the isolation will be decisive.

Therefore, the Fuhrer must reserve the right to give the final order to attack. There must be no simultaneous conflict with the Western Powers (France and England).

If it is not certain that a German-Polish conflict will not lead to war in the West, then the fight must be primarily against England and France, (p. 6)

Fundamentally therefore: Conflict with Poland - beginning with an attack on Poland - will only be successful if the Western Powers keep out of it.
If this is impossible, then it will be better to attack in the West and to settle Poland at the same time.

The isolation of Poland is a matter of skilful politics.

Japan is a weighty problem. Even if at first for various reasons her collaboration with us appears to be somewhat cool and restricted, it is nevertheless in Japan's own interest to take the initiative in attacking Russia in good time.

Economic relations with Russia are possible only if political relations have improved. A cautious trend is apparent in Press comment. It is not impossible that Russia will show herself to be disinterested in the destruction of Poland. Should Russia take steps to oppose us, our relations with Japan may become closer.

If there were an alliance of France, England and Russia against Germany Italy and Japan, I would be constrained to attack England and France with a few annihiliating blows. (p. 7). The Fuhrer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England. We mustprepare ourselves for the conflict. England sees in our development the foundation of a hegemony which would weaken England. England is therefore our enemy, and the conflict with England will be a life-and-death struggle.

What will this struggle be like?

England cannot deal with Germany and subjugate us with a few powerful blows. It is imperative for England that the war should be brought as near to the Ruhr basin as possible. French blood will not be spared (West Wall). The possession of the Ruhr basin will determine the duration of our resistance.

The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored. If England and France intend the war between Germany and Poland to lead to a conflict, they will support Holland and Belgium in their neutrality and make them build fortifications, in order finally to force them into cooperation.

Albeit under protest, Belgium and Holland will yield to pressure. (p. 8)

Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war, we must occupy Holland with lightening speed. We must aim at securing a new defence line on Dutch soil up to the Zuider Zee.

H1165 - 0082

The war with England and France will be a life-and-death struggle.

The idea that we can get off cheaply is dangerous; there is no such possibility We must burn our boats, and it is no longer a question of justice or injustice but of life or death for 80 million human beings.

Question: Short or long war?

Every country's armed forces or government must aim at a short war. The government, however, must also be prepared for a war of 10-15 years' duration.

History has always shown that the people have believed that wars would be short. In 1914, the opinion still prevailed that it was impossible to finance a long war. Even today this idea still persists in many minds. But on the contrary, every state will hold out as long as possible, unless it immediately suffers some grave weakening (e.g. Ruhr basin). England has similar weaknesses.

England knows that to lose a war will mean the end of her world power. (p 9)

England is the driving force against Germany.
(Literally: England is the motor driving against Germany). Her strength lies in the following:

1. The British themselves are proud, courageous, tenacious, firm in resistance and gifted as organisers. They know how to exploit every new development. They have the love of adventure and bravery of the Nordic race. Quality is lowered by dispersal. The German average is higher.

2. World power in itself. It has been constant for 300 years. Extended by the acquisition of allies. This power is not merely something concrete, but must also be considered as a psychological force embracing the entire world. Add to this immeasurable wealth, with consequental financial credit.

3. Geopolitical safety and protection by strong sea power and a courageous air force.

England's weakness:

If in the World War I we had had two battleships and two cruisers more, and if the battle of Jutland had begun in the morning, the British fleet would have been defeated and England brought to her knees. It would have meant [illegible] the end of this War (p 10). It was formerly not sufficient to defeat the fleet, landings had to be made in order to defeat England. England could provide her own food supplies. Today it is no longer possible.

The moment England's food supply routes are cut, she is forced to capitulate. The import of food and oil depends on the fleet's protection.

If the German Air Force attacks English territory, England will not be forced to capitulate in one day. But if the fleet is destroyed, immediate capitulation will be the result.

There is no doubt that a surprise attack can lead to a quick decision. It would be criminal, however, for the government to rely entirely on the element of surprise.

Experience has shown that surprise may be nullified by:-

1. Disclosure outside the limit of the military circles concerned;
2. Mere chance, which may cause the collapse of the whole enterprise;
3. Human failings;
4. Weather conditions.

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The final date for striking must be fixed well in advance. Beyond that time the tension cannot be endured for long. (p 11). It must be borne in mind that weather conditions can render any surprise intervention by Navy and Air Force impossible.

This must be regarded as a most unfavourable basis for action.

1. An effort must be made to deal the enemy a significant or the final decisive blow. Considerations of right and wrong, or treaties, do not enter into the matter.
This will only be possible if we are not involved in a war with England on account of Poland.

2. In addition to the surprise attack, preparations for a long war must be made, while opportunities on the Continent for England are eliminated.

The army will have to hold positions essential to the Navy and Air Force. If Holland and Belgium are successfully occupied and held, and if France is also defeated, the fundamental conditions for a successful war against England will have been secured.

England can then be blockaded from Western France at close quarters by the Air Force, while the Navy with its submarines can extend the range of the blockade.

(page 12)

Consequences:

England will not be able to fight on the Continent:
Daily attacks by the Air Force and Navy will cut all her life-lines;
Time will not be on England's side;
Germany will not bleed to death on land.

Such strategy has been shown to be necessary by World War I and subsequent military operations. World War I is responsible for the following strategic considerations which are imperative:-

1. With a more powerful Navy at the outbreak of the war, or a wheeling movement by the Army towards the Channel ports, the end would have been different.

2. A country cannot be brought to defeat by an Air Force. It is impossible to attack all objectives simultaneously and the lapse of time of a few minutes would evoke defensive counter-measures.

3. The unrestricted use of all resources is essential.

4. Once the Army, in cooperation with the Air Force and the Navy, has taken the most important positions, industrial production will cease to flow into the bottomless pit of the Army's battles and can be diverted to benefit the Air Force and Navy. (p 13)

The Army must therefore be capable of taking these positions. Systematic preparation must be made for the attack.

Study to this end is of the utmost importance.

The aim will always be to force England to her knees.

A weapon will only be of decisive importance in winning battles, so long as the enemy does not possess it.

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This applies to gas, submarines and the Air Force. It would be true of the latter for instance, as long as the English fleet had no available counter-measures; it will no longer be the case in 1940 and 1941. Against Poland, for example, tanks will be effective, as the Polish Army possesses no counter-measures.

Where straight forward pressure is no longer considered to be decisive, its place must be taken by the elements of surprise and by masterly handling.

This is the plan of attack

The plan demands:- (Page 14)

1. A correct estimate of weapons and their effectiveness:-
   e.g. (a) Battleship or aircraft carrier; which is the more effective? individually or considered as a whole? The aircraft carrier is the better protection for a convoy.

   (b) Is air attack more important on a factory than on a battleship? Where are bottlenecks in production located?

2. Immediate preparedness on the part of the Army.
   The Army must move straight from its peace stations to overrun neighbouring states. (Literally: Neighbouring states must be overrun direct from barracks).

3. A study of the enemy's weak points.

These studies must not be left to the General Staffs. Secrecy would no longer be guaranteed.

This staff will keep the Fuhrer informed and report to him.

(page 15)

The planning staff is responsible for the planning of operations on the highest leve, and on the technical preparations and organisation necessarily required by the decisions taken.

The purpose of certain regulations concerns no-one outside the staff.

However great are the increases in the armaments of our adversaries, they must, at some time, come to the end of their resources, and ours will be greater. French recruiting - 120,000 men in each age class!

We shall not be forced into a war, but we shall not be able to avoid one.

Secrecy is the decisive requirement for success. Our object must be kept secret even from Italy or Japan. The break-through through the Maginot line is still a possibility for Italy, and must be studied. The Fuhrer considers that such a break-through is possible.

The close combination of the services, for the study of the problem in its entirety, is important.

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The object:

1. Study of the problem in its entirety.
2. Study of the procedure.
3. Study of the necessary requirements.
4. Study of the necessary training.

The staff must include men with great imaginative power and the best technical knowledge, as well as officers of sober and sceptical judgment.

Working principles:

1. No-one must be admitted who is not concerned.
2. No-one may know more than it is necessary for him to know.
3. When must the person concerned know, at latest? No-one may know of a matter earlier than is necessary for him to know of it.

At the request of Field Marshal Goring, the Fuhrer decrees that:

a) The various services shall decide what construction is to be undertaken.
b) There shall be no alterations in the shipbuilding programme.
c) The armaments programme are to be postponed to 1943 or 1944.

Certified correct record
(signed) SCHMUNDT, Lt. Col.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO.386-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Berlin, 10 Nov 1937

NOTES on the Conference in the Reichskanzlei
on 5 Nov 37 from 1615 - 2030 hours

Present: The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
The Reichsminister for War, Generalfeldmarschall v. BLOMBERG
The C-in-C Army, Generaloberst Freiherr von FRITSCH
The C-in-C Navy, Generaladmiral Dr. h.c. RAEDER
The C-in-C Luftwaffe, Generaloberst GOERING
The Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs Freiherr v. NEURATH
Oberst HOSZBACH

The Fuehrer stated initially that the subject matter of today's conference was of such high importance, that its detailed discussion would certainly in other states take place before the Cabinet, in full session. However, he, the Fuehrer, had decided NOT to discuss this matter in the larger circle of the Reich Cabinet, because of its importance. His subsequent statements were the result of detailed deliberations and of the experiences of his 4½ years in Government; he desired to explain to those present his fundamental ideas on the possibilities and necessities of expanding our foreign policy and in the interests of a far-sighted policy he requested that his statements be looked upon in the case of his death as his last will and testament.

The Fuehrer then stated:

The aim of German policy is the security and the preservation of the nation and its propagation. This is consequently a problem of space.

The German nation comprises 85 million people, which, because of the number of individuals and the compactness of habitation, form a homogeneous European racial body, the like of which cannot be found in any other country. On the other hand it justifies the demand for larger living space more than for any other nation. If there have been no political consequences to meet the demands of this racial body for living space then that is the result of historical development spread over several centuries and should this political condition continue to exist, it will represent the greatest danger to the preservation of the German nation (Volkstum) at its present high level. An arrest of the deterioration of the German element in AUSTRIA and in CZECHOSLOVAKIA is just as little possible as the preservation of the present state in GERMANY itself. Instead of growth, sterility will be introduced, and as a consequence, tensions of a social nature will appear after a number of years, because political and philosophical ideas are of a permanent nature only as long as they are able to produce the basis for the realization of the actual claim of existence of a nation. The German future is therefore dependent exclusively on the solution of the need for living space. Such a solution can be sought naturally only for a limited period, about 1 - 3 generations.

Before touching upon the question of solving the need for

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living space, it must be decided whether a solution of the German position with a good future can be attained, either by way of an autarchy or by way of an increased share in universal commerce and industry.

Autarchy: Execution will be possible only with strict National-Socialist State policy, which is the basis; assuming this can be achieved the results are as follows:

A. In the sphere of raw materials, only limited, but NOT total autarchy can be attained:

1. Wherever coal can be used for the extraction of raw materials autarchy is feasible.

2. In the case of ores the position is much more difficult. Requirements in iron and light metals can be covered by ourselves. Copper and tin, however, can NOT.

3. Cellular materials can be covered by ourselves as long as sufficient wood supplies exist. A permanent solution is not possible.

4. Edible fats - possible.

B. In the case of foods, the question of an autarchy must be answered with a definite "NO".

The general increase of living standards, compared with 30 - 40 years ago, brought about a simultaneous increase of the demand and an increase of personal consumption even among the producers, the farmers, themselves. The proceeds from the production increase in agriculture have been used for covering the increased demand, therefore they represent no absolute increase in production. A further increase in production by making greater demands on the soil is NOT possible because it already shows signs of deterioration due to the use of artificial fertilisers, and it is therefore certain that, even with the greatest possible increase in production, participation in the world market could NOT be avoided.

The considerable expenditure of foreign currency to secure food by import, even in periods when harvests are good, increases catastrophically when the harvest is really poor. The possibility of this catastrophe increases correspondingly to the increase in population, and the annual 560,000 excess in births would bring about an increase consumption in bread, because the child is a greater bread eater than the adult.

Permanently to counter the difficulties of food supplies by lowering the standard of living and by rationalisation is impossible in a Continent which had developed an approximately equivalent standard of living. As the solving of the unemployment problem has brought into effect the complete power of consumption, some small corrections in our agricultural home production will be possible, but NOT a wholesale alteration of the standard of food consumption. Consequently autarchy becomes impossible, specifically in the sphere of food supplies as well as generally.

Participation in World Economy. There are limits to this which we are unable to transgress. The market fluctuations would be an obstacle to a secure foundation of the German position; international commercial agreements do NOT offer any guarantee for practical execution. It must be considered on principle that since the World War (1914-18) as industrialization has taken place in countries which formerly exported food. We live in a period of economic empires, in which the tendency to colonies again approaches the condition which originally motivated colonisation; in JAPAN and ITALY economic motives are the basis of their will to expand, and economic need will also drive GERMANY to it. Countries outside the great economic empires have special difficulties in expanding economically.

The upward tendency, which has been caused in world economy, due to armament competition, can never form a permanent basis for an economic settlement,

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and this latter is also hampered by the economic disruption caused by Bolshevism. There is a pronounced military weakness in those States who base their existence on export. As our exports and imports are carried out over those sea lanes which are dominated by BRITAIN, it is more a question of security of transport rather than one of foreign currency, and this explains the great weakness in our food situation in wartime. The only way out, and one which may appear imaginary, is the securing of greater living space, an endeavour which at all times has been the cause of the formation of states and of movements of nations. It is explicable that this tendency finds no interest in GENEVA and in satisfied States. Should the security of our food position be our foremost thought, then the space required for this can only be sought in EUROPE, but we will not copy liberal capitalist policies which rely on exploiting colonies. It is NOT a case of conquering people, but of conquering agriculturally useful space. It would also be more to the purpose to seek raw material producing territory in EUROPE directly adjoining the Reich and not overseas, and this solution would have to be brought into effect for one or two generations. What would be required at a later date over and above this must be left to subsequent generations. The development of great world-wide national bodies is naturally a slow process and the German people, with its strong racial root, has for this prupose the most favorable foundations in the heart of the European Continent. The history of all times - Roman Empire British Empire - has proved that every space expansion can only be effected by breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are unavoidable; neither formerly nor today has space been found without an owner; the attacker always comes up against the proprietor.

The question for GERMANY is: where the greatest possible conquest could be made at lowest cost.

German politics must reckon with its two hateful enemies, ENGLAND, and FRANCE, to whom a strong German colossus in the center of EUROPE would be intolerable. Both these states would oppose a further reinforcement of GERMANY, both in EUROPE and overseas, and in this opposition they would have the support of all parties. Both countries would view the building of German military strongpoints overseas as a threat to their overseas communications, as a security measure for German commerce, and retrospectively a strengthening of the German position in EUROPE.

ENGLAND is NOT in a position to cede any of her colonial possessions to us owing to the resistance which she experiences in the Dominions. After the loss of prestige which ENGLAND has suffered owing to the transfer of ABYSSINIA to Italian ownership, a return of EAST AFRICA can no longer be expected. Any resistance on ENGLAND's part would at best consist in the readiness to satisfy our colonial claims by taking away colonies which at the present moment are NOT in British hands, e.g. ANGOLA. French favours would probably be of the same nature.

A serious discussion regarding the return of colonies to us could be considered only at a time when ENGLAND is in a state of emergency and the German Reich is strong and well-armed. The Fuehrer does not share the opinion that the Empire is unshakeable. Resistance against the Empire is to be found less in conquered territories than amongst its competitors. The British Empire and the Roman Empire cannot be compared with one another in regard to durability; after the Punic Wars the latter did not have a serious political enemy. Only the dissolving effects which originated in Christendom, and the signs of age which creep into all states, made it possible for the Ancient Germans to subjugate Ancient ROME.

Alongside the British Empire today a number of States exist which are stronger than it. The British Mother Country is able to defend its colonial possessions only allied with other States and NOT by its own power. How could ENGLAND alone, for example, defend CANADA against attack by AMERICA or its Far Eastern interests against an attack by JAPAN.

The singling out of the British Crown as the bearer of Empire unity is in itself an admission that the universal empire cannot be maintained permanently by poor politics. The following are significant pointers in this respect:

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 386 PS
Continued

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a) IRELAND's struggle for independence

b) Constitutional disputes in INDIA where ENGLAND, by her half-measures, left the door open for Indians at a later date to utilise the non-fulfillment of constitutional promises as a weapon against BRITAIN.

c) The weakening of the British position in the FAR EAST by JAPAN.

d) The opposition in the MEDITERRANEAN to ITALY which - by virtue of its history, driven by necessity and led by a genius - expands its power position and must consequently infringe British interests to an increasing extent. The outcome of the ABYSSINIAN War is a loss of prestige for BRITAIN which ITALY is endeavoring to increase by stirring up discontent in the MOHAMMEDAN world.

It must be established in conclusion that the Empire cannot be held permanently by power politics by 45 million Britons, in spite of all the solidity of her ideals. The proportion of the populations in the Empire, compared with that of the Motherland is 9:1, and it should act as a warning to us that if we expand in space, we must NOT allow the level of our population to become too low.

France's position is more favorable than that of ENGLAND. The French Empire is better placed geographically, the population of its colonial possessions represents a potential military increase. But FRANCE is faced with difficulties of internal politics. At the present time only 10 per cent approximately of the nations have parliamentary governments whereas 90 per cent of them have totalitarian governments. Nevertheless we have to take the following into our political consideration as power factors:

BRITAIN, FRANCE, RUSSIA and the adjoining smaller States.

The German question can be solved only by way of force, and this is never without risk. The battles of FREDERICK THE GREAT for SILESIA, and BISMARCK's wars against AUSTRIA and FRANCE had been a tremendous risk and the speed of PRUSSIAN action in 1870 had prevented AUSTRIA from participating in the war. If we place the decision to apply force with risk at the head of the following expositions, then we are left to reply to the questions "when" and "how". In this regard we have to decide upon three different cases.

Case 1. Period 1943-45 After this we can only expect a change for the worse. The re-arming of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, as well as the formation of the Officers' Corps, are practically concluded. Our material equipment and armaments are modern, with further delay the danger of their becoming out-of-date will increase. In particular the secrecy of "special weapons" cannot always be safeguarded. Enlistment of reserves would be limited to the current recruiting age groups and an addition from older untrained groups would be no longer available.

In comparison with the re-armament, which will have been carried out at that time by the other nations, we shall decrease in relative power. Should we not act until 1943/45, then , dependent on the absence of reserves, any year could bring about the food crisis, for the countering of which we do NOT possess the necessary foreign currency. This must be considered as a "point of weakness in the regime". Over and above that, the world will anticipate our action and will increase counter-measures yearly. Whilst other nations isolate themselves we should be forced on the offensive.

What the actual position would be in the years 1943/45 no one knows today. It is certain, however, that we can wait no longer.

On the one side the large armed forces, with the necessity for securing their upkeep, the ageing of the Nazi movement and of its leaders, and on the other side the prospect of a lowering of the standard of living and a drop in the birth rate, leaves us no other choice but to act. If the Fuehrer is still living, then it will be his irrevocable decision to solve the German space problem no later than 1943/45. The necessity for action before 1943/45 will come under consideration in cases 2 and 3.

Case 2 Should the social tensions in FRANCE lead to an internal political crisis of such dimensions that it absorbs the French Army and thus renders it incapable for employment in war against GERMANY, thenthe time for action against CZECHOSLOVAKIA has come.

Case 3 It would be equally possible to act against CZECHOSLOVAKIA if FRANCE should be so tied up by a war against another State, that it cannot "proceed" against GERMANY.

For the improvement of our military political position it must be our first aim, in every case of entanglement by war, to conquer CZECHOSLOVAKIA and AUSTRIA simultaneously, in order to remove any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance Westwards. In the case of a conflict with FRANCE it would hardly be necessary to assume that CZECHOSLOVAKIA would declare war on the same day as FRANCE. However, CZECHOSLOVAKIA's desire to participate in the war will increase proportionally to the degree to which we are being weakened. Its actual participation could make itself felt by an attack on SILESIA, either towards the North or the West.

Once CZECHOSLOVAKIA is conquered - and a mutual frontier, GERMANY-HUNGARY is obtained - then a neutral attitude by POLAND in a German-French conflict could more easily be relied upon. Our agreements with POLAND remain valid only as long as GERMANY's strength remains unshakeable; should GERMANY have any setbacks then an attack by POLAND against EAST PRUSSIA, perhaps also against POMERANIA, and SILESIA, must be taken into account.

Assuming a development of the situation, which would lead to a planned attack on our part in the years 1943/45, then the behaviour of FRANCE, ENGLAND, POLAND and RUSSIA would probably have to be judged in the following manner:

The Fuehrer believes personally that in all probability ENGLAND and perhaps also FRANCE have already silently written off CZECHOSLOVAKIA, and that they have got used to the idea that this question would one day be cleaned up by GERMANY. The difficulties in the British Empire and the prospect of being entangled in another long-drawn-out European War, were decisive factors in the non-participation of ENGLAND in a war against GERMANY. The British attitude would certainly NOT remain without influence on FRANCE's attitude. An attack by FRANCE without British support is hardly probable assuming that its offensive would stagnate along our Western fortifications. Without ENGLAND's support, it would also NOT be necessary to take into consideration a march by FRANCE through BELGIUM and HOLLAND, and this would also not have to be reckoned with by us in case of a conflict with FRANCE, as in every case it would have as consequence the enmity of GREAT BRITAIN. Naturally, we should in every case have to bar our frontier during the operation of our attacks against CZECHOSLOVAKIA and AUSTRIA. It must be taken into consideration here that CZECHOSLOVAKIA's defence measures will increase in strength from year to year, and thata consolidation of the inside values of the Austrian army will also be effected in the course of years. Although the population of CZECHOSLOVAKIA in the first place is not a thin one, the embodiment of CZECHOSLOVAKIA and AUSTRIA would nevertheless constitute the conquest of food for 5-6 million people, on the basis that a compulsory emigration of 2 million from CZECHOSLOVAKIA and of 1 million from AUSTRIA could be carried out. The annexation of the two States to GERMANY militarily and politically would constitute a considerable relief, owing to shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of fighting personnel for other purposes and the possibility of re-constituting new armies up to a strength of about 12 Divisions, representing a new division per 1 million population.

No opposition to theremoval of CZECHOSLOVAKIA is expected on the part of ITALY; however, it cannot be judge today what would be her attitude in the Austrian question since it would depend largely on whether the DUCE were alive at the time or not.

The measure and speed our our action would decide POLAND's attitude. POLAND will have little inclination to enter the war against a victorious GERMANY, with RUSSIA in the rear.

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Military participation by RUSSIA must be countered by the speed of our operations; it is a question whether this need to taken into consideration at all in view of JAPAN'S attitude.

Should Case 2 occur - paralysation of FRANCE by a Civil war - then the situation should be utilized at any time for operations against CZECHOSLOVAKIA, as GERMANY's most dangerous enemy would be eliminated.

The Fuehrer sees Case 3 looming nearer; it could develop from the existing tensions in the MEDITERRANEAN, and should it occur he has firmly decided to make use of it any time, perhaps even as early as 1938.

Following recent experiences in the course of the events of the war in SPAIN, the Fuehrer does NOT see an early end to hostilities there. Taking into consideration the time required for past offensives by FRANCE, a further three years duration of war is within the bounds of possibility. On the other hand, from the German point of view a 100 per cent victory by FRANCE is not desirable; we are more interested in a continuation of the war and preservation of the tensions in the MEDITERRANEAN. Should FRANCO be in sole possession of the Spanish Peninsula it would mean the end of Italian intervention and the presence of ITALY on the BALEARIC ISLES. As our interests are directed towards continuing the war in SPAIN, it must be the task of our future policy to strengthen ITALY in her fight to hold on to the BALEARIC ISLES. However, a solidification of Italian positions on the BALEARIC ISLES can NOT be tolerated either by FRANCE or by ENGLAND and could lead to a war by FRANCE and ENGLAND against ITALY, in which case SPAIN, if entirely in white (i.e. FRANCO's) hands, could participate on the side of ITALY's enemies. A subjugation of ITALY in such a war appears very unlikely. Additional raw materials could be brought to ITALY via GERMANY. The Fuehrer believes that ITALY's military strategy would be to remain on the defensive against FRANCE on the Western frontier and carry out operations against FRANCE from LIBYA against the North African French colonial possessions.

As a landing of French-British troops on the Italian coast can be discounted, and as a French offensive via the ALPS to Upper ITALY would be extremely difficult and would probably stagnate before the strong Italian fortifications, French lines of communication by the Italian fleet will to a great extent paralyze the transport of fighting personnel from North Africa to FRANCE, so that at its frontiers with ITALY and GERMANY, FRANCE will have at its disposal solely the metropolitan fighting forces.

If GERMANY profits from this war by disposing of the CZECHOSLOVAKIAN and the AUSTRIAN questions, the probability must be assumed that ENGLAND - being at war with ITALY - would not decide to commence operations against GERMANY. Without British support a warlike action by FRANCE against GERMANY is not to be anticipated.

The date of our attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria must be made independent on the course of the Italian-French-English war and would not be simultaneous with the commencement of military operations by these three States. The Fuehrer was also not thinking of military agreements with Italy, by in complete independence and by exploiting this unique favourable opportunity, he wishes to begin to carry out operations against Czechoslovakia. The attack on Czechoslovakia would have to take place with the "speed of lightening (blitzartig schnell)".

Fieldmarshall von BLOMBERG and Generaloberst von FRITSCH in giving their estimate on the situation, repeatedly pointed out that ENGLAND and FRANCE must not appear as our enemies, and they stated that the war with ITALY would NOT bind the French army to such an extent that it would NOT be in a position to Commence operations on our Western frontier with superior forces. Generaloberst von FRITSCH estimated the French forces which would presumable be employed on the ALPINE frontier against ITALY to be in the region of 20 divisions, so that a strong French superiority would still remain on our Western frontier. The French would, according to German reasoning, attempt to advance into the RHINELAND. We should consider the lead which FRANCE has got in mobilization, and quite apart from the very small value of our then existing fortifications - which was pointed out particularly by Generalfieldmarschall von BLOMBERG - the

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four motorized divisions which had been laid down for the West would be more or less incapable of movement. With regard to our offensive in a South-Easterly direction, Fieldmarschall von BLOMBERG drew special attention to the strength of the CZECHOSLOVAKIAN fortifications, the building of which had assumed the character of a MAGINOT line and which would present extreme difficulties to our attack.

Generaloberst von FRITSCH mentioned that it was the purpose of a study which he had laid on for this winter to investigate the possibilities of carrying out operations against CZECHOSLOVAKIA with special consideration of the conquest of the Czechoslovakian system of fortifications; the Generaloberst also stated that owing to the prevailing conditions he would have to relinquish his leave abroad, which was to begin on the 10 November. This intention was countermanded by the Fuehrer who gave as a reason that the possibility of the conflict was not to be regarded as being so imminent. In reply to statements by Generalfieldmarschall von BLOMBERG and Generaloberst von FRITSCH regarding ENGLAND and FRANCE's attitude, the Fuehrer repeated his previous statements and said that he was convinced of BRITAIN's non-participation and the consequently he did not believe in military action by FRANCE against GERMANY. Should the MEDITERRANEAN conflict already mentioned lead to a general mobilization in EUROPE, then we should have to commence operations against CZECHOSLOVAKIA immediately. If, however, the powers who are not participating in the war should declare their disinterestedness, then GERMANY would , for the time being, have to side with this attitude.

In view of the information given by the Fuehrer, Generaloberst GOERING considered it imperative to think of a reduction or abandonment of our military undertaking in SPAIN. The Fuehrer agreed to this in so far as he believed this decision should be postponed for a suitable date.

The second part of the discussion concerned material armament questions.

(in ink)
Certified: (Signed) HOSZBACH

Kirchbach
Oberst. d. A. (Col. General Staff)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 386 PS

14 November 1945

I, E. GLAZIER, P/O, 37371, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the avove is a true and correct translation of Document No. 386 PS.

E. GLAZIER
P/O, 37371

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Exhibit GB 217
Filed Jan. 15, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2031-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, No. 10

distributed on 5 February 1938, Page 112

Decree relating to the Establishment of a Secret Cabinet Council of February 4, 1938

("Erlass über die Errichtung eines Geheimen Kabinettsrats")

As my advisary board in the direction of the foreign policy, I hereby install a secret cabinet council.

I appoint as President of the secret cabinet council the Reichminister Freiherr von Neurath.

I appoint as members of the secret cabinet council:

The Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs Joachim von Ribbentrop
The Prussian Minister - President, Reich Minister for Aeronautics and Supreme Commander of the "Luftwaffe" General Field Marshall Herman Göring.
The Deputy of the Führer, Reich-Minister Rudolf Hess
The Reich Minister for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda, Dr. Joseph Goebbels.
The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory, Dr. Hans Heinrich Lammers
The Supreme Commander of the Army, Colonel General Walther von Brauchitsch,
The Supreme Commander of the Navy, General Admiral Dr. h.c. Erich Raeder,
The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht, General of the Artillery Wilhelm Keitel.

The current affairs of the secret cabinet council will be conducted by the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory.

Berlin, February 4, 1938

The Führer and Reich Chancellor

ADOLF HITLER

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory,

Dr. LAMMERS

20 November 1945

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NUMBER 2031PS

I, FELIX EDWARD SHARTON, 046312, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2031 PS.

FELIX EDWARD SHARTON
0-46312

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2098-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF COUNSEL

1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 215

Decree
relating to the Status of the Supreme Commanders
of the Army and Navy
of 25 Feb 1938

Erlass
ueber die Stellung der Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres
und der Kriegsmarine
von 25 Febr. 38

The Supreme Commander of the Army, General von Brauchitsch, carries the equivalent rank of a Minister of the Reich - as has already been the case with the Supreme Commander of the Navy, Admiral Dr. h.c. Raeder

Following my orders, the Supreme Commanders of the Army and Navy shall participate in the meetings of the Reich Cabinet.

Order No. 461 of April 20, 1936 (Heeresverordnungsblatt page 163) is rescinded -

Munich, 25 Feb 1938

Der Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor

Adolf Hitler

The Reich Minister and Chief of the
Reich Chancellery

Dr Lammers

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2098-PS

10 November 194[illegible]

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5, 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document Nr. 2098-PS.

GOETZ MAYER
T/5, 33812169

(3309)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2194-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Berchtesgaden, the 4, September 1938

Note to the Reich Defense Law

1. The Publications of the Reich Defense Law of 4 Sept. 1938, remains suspended.

2. The following laws and cabinet decisions are repeated effective immediately.

A. Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935.

B. Decision of the Reich Cabinet of 4 April 1933 to form a Reich Defense Counsel.

C. Rectification and completion of 13 Dec. 1934 of the decision of the Reich Cabinet of 4 Apr. 1933.

D. Decision of the Reich Cabinet of 21 May 1935 on activity of the CB in peace times.

The Leader and Reich Chancellory,
(Signed) Adolph Hitler

The Reich Minister and Chief
of Reich Chancellory
(Signed) Dr. Lammers

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2149-PS

I, A. BREINER, X-046349, Civilian, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2194-PS

A. BREINER
Civilian
X-046349

H1165 - 0095

H1165 - 0096

TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS OF DOCUMENT 2879-PS
(cont.)

Extract from: The Archive

2.) Das Archiv (April 1936) Vol. 25.p. 45 20th April 1936

Promotions in the Armed Forces on the occasion of the Fuehrer's birthday

On the Fuehrer's birthday, which the Wehrmacht celebrated on all stations by the holding of parades - cf. Si. p. 60 - the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces promoted the Reich Minister for War and C-in-C of the Armed Forces, General von Blomberg to Generalfeldmarschall with immediate effect, - also the C-in-C of the Army, Baron v. Fritsch, General of the Artillery to full General (Generaloberst), the C-in-C of Navy, Admiral and Hon. Doctor Raeder, to General Admiral, the Reichs Minister for Air and C-in-C of the Air Force, Air Chief Marshal (General der Flieger) Goering, to full General (Generaloberst).

The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor further gave orders that the C-in-C of the Army, Baron v. Fritsch, (General of the Artillery), and the C-in-C of the Navy, Admiral and Hon. Doctor Raeder, should be given a rank equivalent to that of Ministers of the Reich. They will continue to hold the titles of office they have held hitherto. The Cs-in-C of the three services remain under the military control of the Reich Minister for War and the C-in-C of the Armed Forces.
Lutze, the Chief of Staff of the S.A., sent telegrams to the Reich Minister for War and the Cs-in-C of the three services expressing the congratulations of the S.A. on the occasion of their promotion.

H1165 - 0097

Extracts from The Archive (Das Archiv)

3). Das Archiv (January 1937) Vol. 34, P. 1503-04 30th January 1937

Commemoration session of the Reich Cabinet. Gold Party badge presented to all members of the Cabinet

On the afternoon of January 30th the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor had summoned the members of the Reich Cabinet (Reichsregierung) to the Cabinet room of the Chancery for a ministerial conference, which took the form of an impressive celebration of the fourth anniversary of the day on which the Hitler Cabinet had been convened by President von Hindenburg.

The Fuehrer recalled the political development of the past four years, which had assumed epoch-making proportions, such as no-one could have foreseen four years ago. The Fuehrer thanked the members of the Reich Cabinet for all they had done and for their loyal cooperation, paying special tribute to the great achievements of the individual ministers in the own spheres of work.

Having regard to the fact that the ban on the entry of members into the party is to be removed very shortly, the Fuehrer, as a first step in this direction, then personally enrolled into the party the members of the Cabinet who had not previously belonged to it, and presented them at the same time with the gold party-badge, the highest party honour. The Fuehrer also conferred the gold party badge on General von Fritsch, General-Admiral, Dr. Raeder, the Prussian Minister of Finance, Professor Popitz and the Secretary of State and Chief of the Presidential Chancery, Dr. Meissner. The Fuehrer also decorated the following party members with the gold party badge: State Secretary Dr. Lammers, State Secretary Funk, State Secretary Koerner and Air Commodore (General der Flieger) Milch, State Secretary.

The President of the Cabinet Council, General Goering, thereupon thanked the Fuehrer in moving words in the name of the whole Cabinet for all the greatness and beauty which they had all experienced and helped to create in the past four years under the leadership of Adolf Hitler. He assured the Fuehrer that his most loyal colleagues were in the Cabinet and that all of them would gladly stake their all with enthusiasm to help the Fuehrer to the limit of their ability to carry out his great and unique plans. General Goering closed his address with best wishes for the personal welfare and the life and work of the Fuehrer.

The Reich Minister for War, Generalfeldmarschall von Blomberg thanked the Fuehrer in the name of the Armed Forces for the unique experience which every soldier had had in the past four years. The Reich Foreign Minister, Baron von Neurath, gave a vote of thanks in the name of those members of the Cabinet who had not previously belonged to the party.

H1165 - 0098

Extracts from: Das Archiv

5). Das Archiv (April 1939) Vol 61, p. 42 1 April 1939

Promotion of Raeder to Grossadmiral

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has promoted the C-in-C Navy, General Admiral Dr. h. c. Erich Raeder to the rank of Grossadmiral in recognition of his services in building up the Navy. At the conclusion of the launching of the battleship "Tirpitz", the Fuehrer personally announced the promotion to the C-in-C Navy from the quarter-deck of the battleship "Scharnhorst" where all the admirals of the Navy, all unit-leaders and commanders were assembled; after a speech, he handed him the symbol of the office of Grossadmiral with the inscription: "The first Grossadmiral of the Third Reich. Adolf Hitler" together with the record of promotion and a letter.

H1165 - 0099

Extracts from: Das Archiv

6). Das Archiv (January 1943) Vol. 106, p. 886 30 January 1943

Grossadmiral Raeder to the Navy

Grossadmiral Raeder gave the following order of the day to the Navy:

To the Navy.

The Fuehrer has complied, with my request that I be relieved of my office and duties as C-in-C Navy and Chief of the Naval War Staff, with effect from 30 January 1943, on account of my state of health. At the same time, he has appointed as my successor F.O. U-boats, Admiral Doenitz, who is promoted to the rank of Grossadmiral.

I took over the direct of the Navy in hard times. During the long years I was in office, I strove with all my powers to develop it, from the very beginnings of its construction, into a powerful instrument which the Reich needed for asserting its interests and tasks in the world. Carried through by the trust of our beloved Fuehrer and supported by the most faithful cooperation of the whole Navy, I have been permitted to make a decisive contribution to the accomplishment of this lofty task in the greatest and most difficult period in the history of our people. The victories and successes which the Navy has gained in Greater Germany's fight for freedom, under my leadership will go down in history. I am proud to be able to say this. They were gained by the unconditional devotion of everyone. Officers, N.C.O.s, and crews, officials, employees and workers have worked together in friendly rivalry, with a noble community spirit and in true comradeship, to make their contribution to the gaining of victory. It is for me a deep inner duty and my heart's need to express my thanks to the whole Navy for the countless proofs of this spirit.

Long live the Fuehrer

Berlin, 30 January 1943 Raeder, Grossadmiral

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF EXTRACTS OF DOCUMENT
NO. 2879-PS

13 December 1945

I, CATHERINE BEDFORD, 110561, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Extracts of Document No. 2879-PS.

CATHERINE BEDFORD
110561

H1165 -0100

Document No. 2838-PS
OFFICE U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

OFFICES AND POSITIONS HELD BY DEFENDANT ERICH RAEDER

It is hereby agreed that Erich RALDER, a defendant in the action pending before the International Military Tribunal, was appointed or elected, as the case may be, to the positions, and held the offices entitled thereto during the time as set forth below:

1876 Born in Wandsbek, near Hamburg.
1894 Joined the German Navy
1897 Commissioned Leutnant
1903- 1905 Press Officer in Reichsmarineamt
1910- 1912 Navigation Officer on "Hohenzollern" (Kaiser's yacht)
1911 Korvettenkapitaen
1915 Commander of "Koeln" (Cruiser)
1918 Head of Central Division of Reichsmarineamt
1922 Konteradmiral - Inspector of Naval Training, Kiel
1924 Commander of Light Forces in North Sea
1925- 1928 Chef der Marinestation der Ostsee, Kiel
1925 Vizeadmiral
1928 Admiral - Chief of Naval Command (Chef der Marineleitung)
1935 Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine (OKM)
1936 (Apr 20) General Admiral - Hitler, on his 47th birthday, created this rank for Raeder.
1937 (Jan 30) "Golden Badge of Honor" (Als Orden, being a decoration)
1938 (Feb 4) Member of Secret Cabinet Council (Geheimer Kabinettsrat)
1939 (Apr 1) Grossadmiral - rank created by Hitler, who presented him with a Marshall's baton.
1943 (Jan 30) Admiralinspekteur - Replaced as OKM by Dönitz.

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that the above is true, this 14 day of November 1945

/s/ Erich Raeder
DEFENDANT

Dr. Siemers
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

Exhibit GB 218
Filed Jan. 15, 1946

H1165-0101

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 3260 PS
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Völkischer Beobachter
23 October 1939, page 3

Churchill sunk the "Athenia".

The above picture shows the proud "Athenia", the ocean giant, which was sunk by Churchill's crime. One can clearly see the big radio equipment on board the ship. But nowhere was an SOS heard from the ship. Why was the "Athenia" silent? Because her captain was not allowed to tell the world anything. He very prudently refrained from telling the world that Winston Churchill attempted to sink the ship through the explosion of an infernal machine. He knew it well, but he had to keep silent. Nearly 1500 people would have lost their lives if Churchill's original plan had resulted as the criminal wanted. Yes, he longingly hoped that the 100 Americans on board the ship would find death in the waves, so that the anger of the American people, who were deceived by him, should be directed against Germany as the presumed author of the deed. It was fortunate that the majority escaped the fate intended for them by Churchill. Our picture on the right shows two wounded passengers. They were rescued by the freighter "City of Flint", and, as can be seen here, turned over to the American coast guard boat "Gibb" for further medical treatment. They are an unspoken accusation against the criminal Churchill. Both they and the shades of those who lost their lives call him before the tribunal of the world and ask the British people, "How long will the office, one of the richest in tradition known to Britain's history, be held by a murderer?"

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 3260 - PS

4th December, 1945.

I, MARTHA VON GRONEFELD, AGO NO. 046272; hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the Document No. 3260 - PS.

MARTHA VON GRONEFELD

AGO 046272.

Filed
15.1.46 UK 65
c.157
GB224

At the same time Britain's own economic position is difficult because of the extent of her dependance on supplies from overseas. This position would improve considerably if the United States of America with its large resources were to place itself economically and militarily fully on the side of the enemy powers.

Britain wishes to avoid economic sacrifices just as much as military sacrifices as much as possible. Economically too, the war is not to be "bad business" for Britain. Therefore she attaches the greatest importance to retaining her overseas trade to the largest possible extent. This is only possible through keeping up a great part of her export trade. By hindering British exports as well we will therefore hit Britain in a particularly sensitive spot.

The extent to which Britain depends on Overseas countries, the particular bottlenecks of its economic system and the available alternatives are shown in appendix 1.

To combat German economic warfare, the following steps have been taken by Great Britain up till now:

Extensive formation of convoys protected by cruisers, destroyers, submarines and planes.

Deviations from the normal peacetime Atlantic trading routes for convoys and single ships.

Arming of the great majority of merchantmen and instructions to merchant shipping to make use of their armament against U-boats.

Admiralty orders to the British mercantile Marine to ramm German U-boats.

Aerial reconnaisance on a big scale over all territorial waters and employment of planes against U-boats, partly in collaboration with destroyers and fishing smacks.

Employment of strong formations of submarine chasers against U-boats in the English channel, off the Norwegian coast in the North Sea, along the French and Western Spanish coastline and in own territorial waters.

Employment of cruiser formations against German commerce raiders (Panzerschiffe) in the Atlantic.

If the present form of economic warfare is continued, one can count in principle on the present defence methods being maintained, though with a considerable intensification of safety measures, a more intensive anti U-boat campaign, a perfection of countermeasures against U-boats and a slow increase in the use of mines against our U-boats and surface vessels.

3. Possibilities of future naval warfare.

I. Military requirements for the decisive struggle against Great Britain.

Our naval strategy will have to employ all the military means at our disposal as expeditiously as possible. Military success can be most confidently expected if we attack British sea-communications wherever they are accesible to us with the greatest ruthlessness, the final aim of such attacks is to cut off all imports into and exports from Britain. We should try to consider the interests of Neutrals insofar as this is possible without detriment to military requirements. It is desirable to base all military measures taken on existing international law; however measures which are considered necessary from a military point of view, provided a decisive success can be expected from them, will have to be carried out, even if they are not covered by existing international law.

(37C)

H1165-0102

H1165-0103

In principle therefore any means of warfare which is effective in breaking enemy resistance should be used on some legal conception, even if that entails the creation of a new code of naval warfare.

The supreme War Council, after considering the political, military and economic consequences within the framework of the general conduct of the war, will have to decide what measures of military and legal nature are to be taken. Once it has been decided to conduct economic warfare in its most ruthless form, in fulfilment of military requirements this decision is to be adhered to under all circumstances and under no circumstances may such a decision for the most ruthless form of economic warfare, once it has been made, be dropped or released under political pressure from neutral powers; that is what happened in the World War to our own detriment. Every protest by neutral powers must be turned down. Even threats of further countries, including the U.S. coming into the war which can be expected with certainty should the war last a long time, must not lead to a relaxation in the form of economic warfare once embarked upon. The more ruthlessly economic warfare is waged, the earlier will it show results and the sooner will the war come to an end. The economic effect of such military measures on our own war economy must be fully recognised and compensated through immediate re-orientation of German war economy and the re-drafting of the respective agreements with neutral state; for this, strong political and economic pressure must be employed if necessary.

II. How far are military requirements being fulfilled by the present form of economic warfare ?

The deciding factor in the present conduct of economic warfare is that the existing laws of naval warfare particularly the laws concerning prizes are recognised in principle. Economic warfare is therefore governed at present by the following basic rules :

(a) Individual unarmed enemy merchantmen: stopping, searching, seizing as prize or, where that is impossible, sinking.

(b) Individual neutral merchantmen carrying contraband for the enemy: stopping, searching, seizing as prize or, where that is impossible, sinking.

(c) Enemy merchantmen in convoy and neutral merchantmen in enemy convoy: sinking without warning.

(d) Troop transports: sinking without warning.

(e) All merchantmen resisting seizure or threatening our own ships: sinking without warning.

In view of the requirements of naval warfare and of the fact that a large percentage of enemy merchantmen have been armed and that such merchantmen have been clearly instructed by the Admiralty to make use of their armaments against U-boats, our U-boats are already entitled to sink without warning the following categories:

(a) All enemy merchantmen which are clearly armed.

(b) All enemy or neutral vessels in enemy coastal waters which are blacked out or behave in a suspicious manner.

(c) All ships making use of their wireless on the surfacing of U-boats or during seizure.

At present therefore stopping and searching is still necessary in the case of all individual unarmed enemy merchantmen, all neutral merchantmen proceeding either individually or in neutral convoys.

(871)

H1165-0104

Exhibit US 216
Filed Jan. 15, 1946

D.448

(1)

On the 24th of April, Admiral of the Fleet Raeder celebrates his 66th birthday.

It was to Raeder's credit to have already built up by that time a powerful striking force from the numerically small fleet, despite the fetters of Versailles.

With the assumption of power through National Socialism, began, too, the most fruitful period in the reconstruction of the German Fleet.

The Führer openly expressed his recognition of Raeder's faithful services and unstinted co-operation, by appointing him "General-Admiral" on 20th April, 1936. In April, 1939, on the 45th anniversary of the day on which Raeder first joined the Navy, the Führer on 1st April, 1939, after the launching of the battleship "Tirpitz", expressed his congratulations to the General-Admiral on board the battleship "Scharnhorst" and in further recognition of his merit in building up the Navy of the New Germany, promoted him to "Admiral of the Fleet".

This highest distinction crowned a military career as brilliant as it was meritorious. As a soldier and a seaman, the General-Admiral has proved himself to be the Führer's first and foremost naval collaborator.

The heroic and successful deeds in the years of the World War have been repeated in the War against England. To have created this striking force for the Führer is Admiral of the Fleet Erich Raeder's greatest merit.

Voelkischer Beobachter

25th April, 1942.

H1165-0105

Exhibit GB 215

Document No: D 481.

Filed Jan. 15, 1946

Reich Law Gazette 1934 , Part I, Page 785

Law regarding the swearing in of officials and Soldiers

of the Armed Forces.

20th August 1934.

Paragraph 1.

Public officials and soldiers of the Armed Forces will swear the service oath on entering the service.

Paragraph 2.

1. The service oath of public officials is worded as follows:

"I swear: I will be loyal and obedient to the Leader of the German Reich and People, Adolf Hitler, observe the Laws, and fulfil my official duties conscientiously, so help me God."

2. The service oath of the Soldiers of the Armed Forces is worded as follows:

"I swear this holy oath by God that I will implicitly obey the Leader of the German Reich and People, Adolf Hitler, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and that, as a brave soldier, I will be willing to stake my life at any time for this oath.

Paragraphs 3 and 4.

Berlin, 20th August 1934.

The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor
Adolf Hitler.

The Reichs Minister for the Interior
Frick

The Reichs Minister for War
von Blomberg

H1165-0106

Exhibit GB 220
Filed Jan. 15, 1946

D. 638
AFFIDAVIT No. 10.

STATEMENT.

U-30 returned to harbour about mid-September. I met the captain, Oberleutnant Lemp, on the lockside at Wilhelmshafen, as the boat was entering harbour, and he asked permission to speak to me in private. I noticed immediately that he was looking very unhappy and he told me at once that he thought he was responsible for the sinking of the "Athenia" in the North Channel area. In accordance with my previous instructions he had been keeping a sharp lookout for possible armed merchant cruisers in the approaches to the British Isles, and had torpedoed a ship he afterwards identified as the "Athenia" from wireless broadcasts, under the impression that she was an armed merchant cruiser on patrol. I had never specified in my instructions any particular type of ship as armed merchant cruiser nor mentioned any names of ships. I despatched Lemp at once by air to report to the SKL at Berlin; in the meantime, I ordered complete secrecy as a provisonal measure. Later the same day or early on the following day, I received a verbal order from Kapitän zur See Fricke that:-

1. The affair was to be kept a total secret.

2. The OKM considered that a courtmartial was not necessary as they were satisfied that the captain had acted in good faith.

3. Political explanations would be handled by the OKM.

I had had no part whatsoever in the political events in which the Führer claimed that no U-boat had sunk the "Athenia".

After Lemp returned to Wilhelmshafen from Berlin, I interrogated him thoroughly on the sinking and formed the impression that although he had taken reasonable care, he had still not taken sufficient precautions to establish fully the identity of the ship before attacking; I had previously given very strict orders that all merchant vessels and neutrals were to be treated according to naval prize law, before the occurrence of this incident. I according placed him under cabin arrest, as I felt certain that a court-martial could only acquit him and would entail unnecessary publicity and too much time.

(Signed) KARL DÖNITZ

CITY OF NURNBERG: SS

Before me, WALTER H. RAPP, Captain, Cavalry, ASN 0-454231, an officer duly qualified to take oaths, appeared Grand Admiral KARL DÖNITZ, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing statement consisting of two pages in the English language, and swore that the same was true on the 17th day of November 1945.

(Signed) Walter H. Rapp,
WALTER H. RAPP,
Captain CAV,
0-454231

Filed
Read 15.1.46

GB 232

D 653

TRANSLATION

of

EXTRACTS FROM RAEDER'S SPEECH.

("Das Archiv" March 1939. Pages 1841 - 1846 - Wa 12. 3. 39.)

Hero Commemoration Day and Day of Freedom to Rearm.

Throughout Greater Germany solemnities took place on the occasion of "Hero Commemoration Day". On March 12th 1939, these solemnities were combined for the first time with the celebration of the freedom to rearm. The day's chief event was the ceremony held in the Berlin State Opera House in Unter den Linden. In the presence of Hitler and representatives of the Party and Armed Forces etc., General Admiral Raeder made a speech, extracts of which are given below:-

"Today, four years later, we look back at the road, the mile stones of which are real witnesses of German history. What at that time could be but a hope or expectation - in the heart - of the individual person, but what has previously been for centuries, for so many Germans, a dream and an intense longing, became a reality: Greater Germany! In a development which may seem to an outside spectator to be a miracle, but which in reality has been won thanks to an unshakeable power of faith and unparalleled will to act and conscious of his success, the Fuhrer aware of his good right and supported by the weapons given by him to the Armed Forces since that day, opened the road to the Homeland to the brothers and sisters in Austria (Ostmark) and in the Sudetenland.

This day is an appropriate one for the commemoration as it is not a day of mourning for what has once been lost, but on the contrary it is a day of pride because of that which has been gained for ever. The flags and banners which have been hoisted on the tops of the masts are a sign that the legacy of our dead has been carried out. Those who gave their lives in the belief of Germany's greatness either in the rejoicing and in the limitless enthusiasm of the year 1914 as in the firm and obstinate determination of the year 1918, would not understand, if we, who through the long and dark years have held in our faithful hands their legacy, today on the day of its fulfilment, were only in mourning.

We see in our dead a spiritual power, which reading beyond the grave, allowed the first obstinate belief in a new future of the Nation to take roots, we see an image of a fighting soldier of the last year of the war and at the same time an example of fighting courage to the last. It was this power which enabled these men, who were called upon to form a new Reich based on the experience of frontline fellowship and to unite it in the new Great German community. In spite of all the insults and sufferings of the period after the war this power achieved a victory! A brilliant victory! and we celebrate this victory by remembering our heroes and at the same time by thinking of our new excellent Armed Forces. On this occasion we are not forgetting the greatest sacrifice made by our fathers and brothers. Just because this death is the foundation of our Greater Germany we remember it with gratitude which will never die. No matter where the German soldier stood and fought, on the ground, at sea or in the air, on any front, he was always fighting against odds. He has been called upon to make greater and

3536)

H1165-0107

H1165-0108

and greater efforts and the privations and over-exertions became superhuman. He carried this burden with unshakeable belief in himself and Germany's greatness, being conscious of his responsibility towards his homeland, he considered himself its protection, its shield. He shed blood, he died. And yet he won. If the German Armed Forces and with them the entire German Nation honours their victorious war leaders and if just today the names of the late Field Marshal von Hindenburg, of the generals Ludendorff and Conrad von Hötzendorf or of the admirals Scheer and Count Spee and of the greatest of all airmen, Captain Richthofen are held in respectful rememberance by everyone, it is so because they already became symbols for us. These symbols embody the thought of the millions of unknown and never mentioned dead which the Great War called away from us in order that the nation should live and the Reich continue to exist. .....Thanks to him, this way was made possible after the conditions for this gigantic struggle have been created. National Socialism, which originates from the spirit of the German fighting soldier, has been chosen by the German People as its ideology. The German People follow the symbols of its regeneration with the same great love and fanatical passion. The German People has had practical experience experience of National Socialism and it has not been imposed, as so many outside critics believe. The Fuhrer has shown his people that in the National Socialist racial community lies the greatest and invincible sources of strength, whose dynamic power ensures not only peace at home but also enables to make use of all the Nation's creative powers. He restored to the German People its confidence in itself and in its own ability, and enabled it, through the hallowed right, which had been denied to the German People during their period of weakness, to regain its own strength and apart from that it enabled them to tackle boldly and solve the tremendous problems facing them. With that the German People and its Fuhrer have done more for the peace of Europe and for the entire world than some neighbours are capable of realizing. This is the reason for the clear and unsparing summons to fight Bolshevism and international Jewry, whose race destroying activities we have sufficiently experienced on our own people. Therefore, thealliance, with all similar minded nations who, like Germany, are not willing to allow their strength, dedicated to construction and peaceful work at home to be disrupted by alien ideologies as by parasites of a foreign race. And therefore the demand for equality of rights and for equal respect with all other nations. These conditions alone can provide a guarantee for a peaceful life together on the globe. Within the sphere of our German racial community, we soldiers received from the Fuhrer the task of protecting our Homeland and our peaceful national development and to be teachers of young solders who have been entrusted to us and who pass in numbers through our hands. If later on we instruct in the technical handling of weapons, this task demands that the young soldier should also be taught National Socialist ideology and the problems of life. This part of the task, which becomes for us both a duty of honour and a demand which cannot be refused, can and will be carried out, if we stand shoulder to shoulder and in sincere comradeship to the Party and its organization, whose will and actions like ours serve one purpose only, namely the creation of aGerman man in a community brought together by a common bond. The Armed Forces and the Party thus became more and more united in attitude and spirit. We should have to look to the necessity of a still closer union, it it were not already one of the fundamental principles of the military and national socialist spirit, if we look to see what is happening beyond our frontiers.....

3851)

H1165-0109

Germany is the protector of all Germans within and beyond our frontiers. The shots fired at Almeria are proof of that. That, we can say it today fully conscious of our strength, is the work and the enire merit of one man, whose genial leadership, carried by the unshakeable belief in his people and with immeasurable determination has led a whole nation in a few years from the deepest night into a bright future, who as the creator of Greater Germany is leading us in his unmistakeable way into the future. This example gave all Germans new hopes, new courage and his own convictions. The thanks which the Armed Forces return to their Fuhrer and Commander in Chief will be the vow of unshakeable faithfulness in obedience and the fulfilment of their duties. Faithfully following his example, we will never stray from the path, shown to us and with unanimous determination will give of our best for the People and the Reich. It was the Fuhrer, who led his faithful followers from victory to victory. His conviction gave us strength. His will created a new idealism of action, to which his comrades have stayed faithful to death. Many fell, but they fell as those fighters of the great war fell - for a free Germany. They all planted into a younger generation great tradition of death for a holy cause know-ing that their blood will lead the way towards the freedom of their dreams.

Therefore our thoughts for the millions of dead of the Great War include also those men, who died in the nationalsocialist movement, in the "Freicorps" in Austria and in the Sudetenland, for their free and greater country. And jointly with them we salute the brave men, who voluntarily marched with the columns of the Spanish fighters for freedom, in order to stake their lives for a great idea, the fight against world-bolshevism. They, who died in foreign lands, knew for all times that their blood was shed, in a higher sense, for their country, as a symbol of that mighty torrent of power, that links everything that is German in the world with earthly goods and with blood. And we think also of the dead of the new Wehrmacht, who died a hero's death whilst serving self-sacrificingly, confident of their task as the weapon-bearers of the nation. To us, they are a pledge of the most loyal fulfilment of their duties in the spirit of our great military past.

H1165-0110

Appx "H"

D 654

DOMINION OF CANADA
PROVINCE OF ALBERTA.

Exhibit 913 219
Filed Jan. 15, 1946

TO WIT,

I, Adolf Schmidt

Official Number N 1043 - 33 T

do solemnly declare that:

1. I am now confined to Camp No. 133, Lethbridge, Alberta.

2. That on the first day of war, 3 September 1939 a ship of approximately 10,000 tons was torpedoed in the late hours of the evening by the U - 30.

3. That after the ship was torpedoed and we surfaced again, approximately half an hour after the explosion the Commandant called me to the tower in order to show me the torpedoed ship.

4. That I have seen the ship with my very eyes but that I do not think that the ship could see our U boat at that time on account of the position of the moon.

5. That only a few members of the crew had an opportunity to go to the tower in order to see the torpedoed ship.

6. That apart from myself Oberleutnant Hinsch was in the tower when I saw the steamer after the attack.

7. That I observed that the ship was listing.

8. That no warning shot was fired before the torpedo was launched.

9. That I myself observed much commotion on board of the torpedoed ship.

10. That I believe that the ship had only one smoke stack

11. That in the attack on this steamer one or two torpedoes were fired which did not explode but that I myself have heard the explosion of the torpedo which hit the steamer.

12. That Oberleutnant Lemp waited until darkness before surfacing.

13. That I was severely wounded by aircraft 14 September 1939.

14. That Oberleutnant Lemp, shortly before my disembarkation in Reykjavik 19 September 1939, visited me in the forenoon in the Petty Officers quarters where I was lying severely wounded.

15. That Oberleutnant Lemp then had the Petty Officers' quarters cleared in order to be alone with me.

16. That Oberleutnant Lemp then showed me a declaration under oath according to which I had to bind myself to mention nothing concerning the incidents of 3 September 1939 on board the U - 30.

17. That this declaration under oath had approximately the following wording: "I, the undersigned, swear hereby that I shall shroud in secrecy all happenings of 3 September 1939 on board the U- 30, regardless whether foe
3853) or friend, and that I shall erase from my memory all happenings of this day".

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18. That I have signed this declaration under oath, which was drawn up by the Commandant in his own handwriting, with my left hand very illegibly.

19. That later on in Iceland when I heard about the sinking of the Athenia, the idea came into my mind that the U-30 on the 3 September 1939 might have sunk the Athenia, especially since the Captain caused me to sign the above-mentioned declaration.

20. That up to today I have never spoken to anyone concerning these events.

21. That due to the termination of the war I consider myself freed from my oaths,

and I make this solemn declaration conscientiously believing it to be true and knowing that it is of the same force and effect as if made under oath and by virtue of the Canada Evidence Act.

(Signed) Adolf Schmidt

Declared before me[X])
at Calgary)
in the province of)
Alberta)
this day of 9th)
August 1945)
.....)

(Signed) W.B Gore-Hickman

[X]Barrister, Solicitor, Commissioner for Oaths.

Rec'd Filed 15.1.46
GB 229

D 658

TRANSLATION

9.12.42. The Naval Commander, West France, reports that during the course of the day explosives with magnets to stick on, mapping material dealing with the mouth of the Gironde aerial photographs of the port installations at Bordeaux, camouflage material and food and water for several days were found. Attempts to salvage the canoe were unsuccessful. The Naval Commander, West France, has ordered that both soldiers be shot immediately for attempted sabotage, if their interrogation which has been begun, confirms what has so far been discovered; their execution has, however, been postponed in order to obtain more information.

According to a Wehrmacht report, both soldiers have meanwhile been shot. The measure would be in accordance with the Fuhrer's special order, but is nevertheless something new in international law, since the soldiers were in uniform.

3957)

H1165-0112

Filed
Read 15.1.46
GB231

D 655

TRANSLATION

C. in C. NAVY'S private interview with the Fuhrer following the conference on 6.1.1943.

C. in C. NAVY (Raeder) declared that after the remarks just made by the FUHRER about the morale of the navy, etc., and after the message that he had had passed to him by telephone on 1.1.43, he could no longer consider himself capable of holding the post of C. in C. Navy, as he was responsible for the morale of the navy.

Fuhrer (Hitler) immediately tried to tone down very considerably his assertions about the morale of the navy, saying he had not criticised the morale of the navy as such, but he had merely contrasted the U-boat arm with the big ships.

R. further explained that the new task, which involved an enormous amount of work and mental and nervous strain, was beyond his powers. In any case, he had intended to request his release from the post of C. in C. Navy on 30.1.43 - after 10 years service under the Fuhrer. He was now asking to be retired on this date, as he was no longer competent to meet the heavy demands, and the danger was ever present that he would one day be considered inadequate for his position.

H. pointed out the constant heavy burden of his own office and was of the opinion that such a release would cause yet another strain for him following the numerous rumours about the pensioning off of the generals.

R. said he agreed that this must be avoided at all costs and if the Fuhrer was anxious to demonstrate that the parting was of the friendliest and wished that the name Raeder should continue to be associated with the navy - particularly abroad, it would perhaps be possible to make an appointment to "Generalinspector", giving appropriate publicity in the Press, etc. But a new C. in C. Navy with full responsibility for this office must be appointed. the position of "Generalinspector", or whatever it was decided to call it, must be purely nominal.

H. accepted this suggestion with alacrity; the "Generalinspector" could perhaps carry out special tasks for him, make tours of inspection, etc. The name Raeder was still to be associated with the navy.
After C. in C. Navy had repeated his request, the Fuhrer definitely agreed to 30.1. as his release date - he would like to think over the details.

R. referred at the same time to the constant underhand attacks made on the navy by the Reichmarshall (Note: GOERING).

H. tried at first to deny this.
However, R. drew attention to his written evidence and mentioned, as an illustration, the Reichmarshall's assertions vis-a-vis Admiral MARSHALL about the number of navy personnel. These allegations were made despite the fact that the Reichmarshall had to admit that the figures had already been corrected at H.Q. by Vice-Admiral KRANCKE. H. remembered the right figures, which amounted to about 600,000.

3903

H1165-0113

H1165-0114

Exhibit US 221
filed Jan. 15, 1946

D.659

TRANSLATION OF EXTRACT FROM THE WAR DIARY OF THE CHIEF OF U BOATS.

27-9-39.

U 30 comes in

She had sunk:

s.s. "Blairlogie"	4,425 tons
s.s. "Fanad Head"	5,274 tons
	9,699 tons

H1165-0115

Exhibit GB 222
Filed Jan. 15, 1946

D 662

War Diary of the Commanding Officer
of U-boat "U-39"

Date and Time	Location, wind, weather, sea, light, visibility, moon, etc.	Narrative
22 Aug. 39 04.00 hrs.		Left Wilhelmshaven
22-28 Aug.	North Sea, Wind S.W.2-3, sea 2, misty to foggy	North Sea, Shetlands, Faroes, approached waiting position. Little interference. Were not sighted. (Sgd.) Lemp
28 Aug - 3 Sept. 39 14.00 hrs.	Square AL 2845	In waiting position. North of operational area in accordance with operational orders for periods of tension. Attempt to negotiate broke down. Hostilities against Pola (Sgd.) Lemp
3 Sep.39 14.00 hrs.	Square AL 0278 wind N.W.3, sea 2, swell, visibility good.	Hostilities against Gt. Britain after British declaration of war. Entered operational area at 180°, speed 10 sea miles
17.00 hrs.		French declaration of war
17.26 hrs.		Received wireless message: "Open hostilities against Gt.Britain immediately. Don't wait for attack. (Sgd.) Lemp
4 Sep.39	Wind S.S.W. 5 - 7, sea 5, squally, misty.	South West corner of operational area. (Sgd.) Lemp
5 Sep.39	Wind S.W. to W.5, misty.	Sighted steamers, one Norwegian and one passenger vessel. According to schedule this was "Duchess of Bedford" (20,000 tons). In accordance with orders, did not stop her. (Sgd.) Lemp.
10 Sep.39	Wind N.W. 2-3, sea 2	Met U-boat "U-48" on way back home. Took in bread. (Sgd.) Lemp

4145)

Filed
~~Read~~ 15.1.46
GB227

1807 - PS

Extract from Jodl's Diary.

16.6.42.

The operational staff of the Navy (Skl), applied on the 29th May, for permission to attack the Brazilian sea and air forces. The Skl considers that a sudden blow against the Brazilian naval and merchant ships is expedient at this juncture (a) because defence measures are still incomplete (b) because there is the possibility of achieving surprise and (c) because Brazil is to all intents and purposes fighting Germany at sea.

4015.

H1165-0116

Filed Jan. 5, 1946
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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

H-1165

Erich Raeder

Jan 5/46

BRITISH DOCUMENT BOOK

No. 10 (ENGLISH)

ERICH RAEDER

H1165-H117